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The Death of the Income Tax
(or, The Rise of America’s Universal Wage Tax)
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY*
I. LOOMINGS
When Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, just weeks into her tenure as
America’s youngest member of Congress, floated the idea of a sixty or seventy
percent top marginal tax rate on incomes over ten million dollars, she was met with
a predictable mixture of shock, scorn, and support.1 Yet there was nothing new in the
idea. AOC, as Representative Ocasio-Cortez is popularly known, was making a
suggestion with sound historical precedent: the top marginal income tax rate in
America had exceeded ninety percent during World War II, and stayed at least as
high as seventy percent until Ronald Reagan took office in 1981.2 And there is an
even deeper sense in which AOC’s proposal was not as radical as it may have seemed
at first. For whether one likes, loves, hates, or fears it, one brute fact stands out about
AOC’s tax gambit: it would do nothing at all to change the tax burdens facing many
of America’s wealthiest billionaires who pay no federal income tax. Two you may
have heard of? How about President Donald J. Trump3 or his son-in-law, Jared
Kushner.4
How can this be? How can progressive efforts to make the wealthy pay a fairer
share of the overall tax burden be doomed from the start? The answer lies in a
surprising, and surprisingly hidden, fact: the individual income tax, as it was intended
to be, is dead. Out of its ashes, a new colossus has arisen: a universal wage tax that

* Robert C Packard Trustee Chair in Law, Economics and Political Science, University
of Southern California; BA, Yale; JD, Harvard Law School; MA (Economics), USC. I thank
James Alm, Scott Altman, David Gamage and Austin Weinstein for comments and Eric
Nyman and David Sorenson for research assistance.
1. See Paul Krugman, The Economics of Soaking the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax-policy-dance
.html [https://perma.cc/HN3E-YZSN]; Aaron Rupar, The Conservative Response to OcasioCortez’s Tax Proposal Has Been Embarrassingly Deceptive: What Conservatives Are Getting
Wrong About Marginal Tax Rates, VOX (Jan. 7, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.vox
.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/7/18171803/ocasio-cortez-70-percent-marginal-tax-rate-scal
ise-norquist-spin [https://perma.cc/8XKJ-4C4N]; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman,
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax Hike Idea Is Not About Soaking the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/opinion/ocasio-cortez-taxes.html
[https://perma.cc/526T-8TUN].
2. See Niall McCarthy, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax Plan Isn’t Unprecedented
Historically, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/01/24
/alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-tax-plan-isnt-unprecedented-historically-infographic/#35e7b3835
4dc [https://perma.cc/X8X2-4J2V].
3. Steve Eder & Megan Twohey, Donald Trump Acknowledges Not Paying Federal
Income Tax for Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us
/politics/donald-trump-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/ZV87-QD3Z].
4. Jesse Drucker & Emily Flitter, Jared Kushner Paid No Federal Income Tax for Years,
Documents Suggest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13
/business/jared-kushner-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/E7HE-GFN9].
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is simple, formless, onerous, and inescapable. America taxes wages, not wealth.
Those few who have significant wealth can easily find ways to live off it, well and
tax-free. America’s many workers have no such choice. AOC’s increased tax rate
would fall on a few working millionaires5 but not on the many billionaires, like
President Trump and Kushner, who have no reportable “income” under current law
on which AOC or anyone else can tax them.
The killing of the income tax has not been open and notorious: such is not the
style of contemporary politics. As with other markers of progressive social policy—
the promises of universal health care, Obamacare, come to mind6—the income tax is
dying a death by stealth, albeit stealth played out in plain view. The plot lines of the
tragedy are apparent. The individual “income” tax has been split in two. One tax, for
the masses, is a simple, increasingly formless wage tax. This wage/income tax adds
higher brackets onto the payroll tax, the model toward which the wage/income tax
aims, to form a single “universal wage tax” providing the vast bulk of the
government’s revenue. A second tax, which I shall call the “ur-income tax,” persists
only for the wealthiest top 1%–5% of the population. This tax, the relics of a true
income tax, still nominally taxes wealth—that is, income from capital—in addition
to wages, as an “income” tax must in order to be an income tax. But this taxation of
wealth as opposed to wages is so porous that it is largely symbolic. Structural features
of the tax—loopholes—allow the wealthy to avoid its sting. Congress and the
executive branch continue to add rules and regulations to help the wealthy avoid tax.
Indeed, a cynic might suggest that the ur-income tax, the original and future tax that
applies to America’s wealthiest, persists only to feed the Wall Street financiers who
help their clients avoid paying it and the politicians and lobbyists who benefit
whenever tax reform specifically for the wealthy is on the legislative table.7 For the
rest of us, the income tax has died, and we are paying a painful price for its killing.
The fate of the income tax correlates closely with an economic-class structure in
America that many have begun to notice.8 For the very top, the 0.1% or so, tax is
essentially voluntary due to basic tax planning available for those living off capital
alone. For the next tier, what Matthew Stewart has taken to calling the new American
aristocracy,9 the ur-income tax continues to apply, as these citizens have a mix of
capital and labor with which to play tax-planning games. For the bottom 90%–95%
of the economic scale, however, the income tax is dead, replaced by the formidable
and inescapable universal wage tax. This is the tale told in the pages ahead.

5. See William Gale, Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax on the Super Rich Won’t Happen. Here’s a
Better Way to Do It, CNN BUS. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/perspect
ives/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax-plan-alternative/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5VH4
-E73U].
6. Joanne Kenen, The Stealth Repeal of Obamacare, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2017, 5:54 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/19/obamacare-repeal-tax-bill-trump-243912
[https://perma.cc/4KVH-X3E8].
7. Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic
of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Matthew Stewart, The 9.9 Percent Is the New American Aristocracy,
ATLANTIC (June 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/the-birth-of
-a-new-american-aristocracy/559130/ [https://perma.cc/SD4F-TGA5].
9. See id.

2020]

DE A TH OF TH E I N CO M E TA X

1235

A. The Trump Tax Cut, in Context
The recent “major overhaul” of the income tax under President Donald J. Trump
in fact continued a decades-long trend to transform the individual income tax into a
flat, or flattened, wage tax for the masses.10 There is barely a need for most
Americans even to fill out forms to pay it. It has already long been the case that just
over one-half of Americans even pay the individual income tax;11 around 150 million
individuals file returns each year.12 Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
(TCJA), only approximately 30% of those who filed had been taking “itemized”
deductions—meaning, among other things, the need to fill out longer forms and a
greater likelihood of being audited by the IRS.13 Under the changes effected by the
TCJA, with an increased “standard deduction” and a continued assault on personal,
itemized deductions, the percentage of itemizers is expected to plunge to around 10%
of income taxpayers.14 This means that ninety-five percent of Americans either will
not need to fill out an income tax return at all or will be approaching the possibility
of a “postcard” return,15 or even more simply, having the government fill out tax
forms for them.16 For most of these taxpayers the overwhelming component of their
income will be wages reported to the government by their employers. There will not
be any personal deductions to keep track of or show on a return. The typical
household will simply add up its wages as reflected on W-2s, subtract the standard
deduction, and look up the amount owed—most of which will already have been paid
through wage-withholding in paychecks. Indeed, millions of Americans will be
happy to get tax refunds on account of their overwithholding.17

10. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305 (2017).
11. Catey Hill, 44% of Americans Won’t Pay Any Federal Income Tax, MONEYISH (Apr.
17, 2017), https://moneyish.com/hoard/44-of-americans-wont-pay-any-federal-income-tax/
[https://perma.cc/WD7Z-U3F5].
12. Brett Collins, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2011–2018,
31 STAT. INCOME BULL. 189, 182 fig.A (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12rswin
bulreturnfilings.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4M2-CQF4].
13. Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/who-itemizes-deductions/ [https://perma.cc/XHZ5-9TXP].
14. Gary Strauss, Higher Standard Deduction Means Fewer Taxpayers to Itemize, AARP
MONEY (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2018/new-standard-deduct
ion-fd.html [https://perma.cc/8X4B-9TTR]; Erica York, Nearly 90 Percent of Taxpayers Are
Projected to Take the TCJA’s Expanded Standard Deduction, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/90-percent-taxpayers-projected-tcja-expanded-standard-deduction/
[https://perma.cc/9BW4-96RC].
15. Howard Gleckman, The New Tax Law’s Really, Really Big Postcard, FORBES (Jan.
29, 2018, 1:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2018/01/29/tax-new-tax-bills-real
ly-really-big-postcard/#7a1dfe1a7bbc [https://perma.cc/73EH-BT85].
16. See Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L
TAX J. 773, 773 (2008) (describing California’s attempt to reform individual tax filing through
its “ReadyReturns” program, which provided a “pro-forma or tentative” tax return to
taxpayers with simple returns).
17. Kathy Frankovic, Americans Are Looking Forward to Their Tax Refunds, YOUGOV
(Apr. 16, 2018), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/04/16/ameri
cans-are-happy-looking-forward-their-tax-refu [https://perma.cc/LBW5-WM3L].
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This is a tax with few or no forms to fill out, little or no variation among taxpayers,
falling only on wages, and automatically collected from paychecks. What should this
remind us of? For ninety percent or more of Americans, the individual income tax is
morphing into the second part of a universal wage tax system that simply adds higher
rate brackets onto the federal payroll tax. The payroll tax has long been a flat-rate
wage tax on the vast majority of American workers, kicking in on the first dollar of
wage income—that is, having no deductions, standard or otherwise. And this payroll
tax already is, for more than three out of four American workers, the major tax they
pay (more than one out of four Americans only pay payroll taxes)18—though they do
not know it.19 Most Americans never fill out any form to pay payroll taxes or pay
any planners to avoid them, students almost never study the tax, the IRS does not
much trouble regular citizens about it, and politicians almost never talk about it. Only
once in its eighty-year history has the payroll tax ever been cut, and that cut—
President Barack Obama’s payroll tax holiday—was undone after two years, when
the government needed to resolve a fiscal crisis of its own making, mainly on account
of reckless cuts to the individual income tax, as we shall consider further below.20
The payroll tax as it is and always has been is a pure wage tax—one that makes
no effort at all to tax income from wealth. It is not an income tax. The more the
“income” tax looks like a payroll tax, the less it is in fact an income tax. President
Trump’s tax cuts dealt a further death blow to what an income tax is supposed to be.
For most Americans, the income tax is dead.
B. The Seeds Planted
The plan radically to transform the income tax into a wage tax in drag, like the
entire history of the payroll tax, has been hidden in plain sight all along, at least since
Grover Norquist published a seminal editorial piece, Step-by-Step Tax Reform, in
2003.21 Conservatives have been surprisingly explicit about their goals of achieving
a tax system with “a single-rate tax, which taxes income one time,” as Norquist put
it.22 Increasingly, since Norquist first set out the plan in simple written form, the “one
time” that “income” gets taxed is as it is earned from labor, just like the payroll tax.
Norquist’s plan was to incrementally bring the “income” tax into synch with the
holy grail of a flat tax, as championed by such conservative luminaries as Steve
Forbes, Richard Armey, Robert Hall, and Alvin Rabushka.23 One can see the plot in

18. Roberton C. Williams, Most Americans Pay More Payroll Tax Than Income Tax, TAX
POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most-americans-paymore-payroll-tax-income-tax [https://perma.cc/8XFP-HK9F].
19. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994).
20. Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining
Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235 (2013).
21. Grover Norquist, Step-by-Step Tax Reform, WASH. POST (June 9, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/06/09/step-by-step-tax-reform/f200
f59d-7370-42f6-837b-265501dc3701/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fde6850c3203 [https://per
ma.cc/3ARN-63NZ].
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 2007);
Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and Base, 2
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the details, such as in the conservative predilection for “Roth-style” treatment of
savings under the “income” tax—going so far as to label the movement
“Rothification” of the income tax.24 Under the Roth model, income is taxed once, as
earned, and never again. This is also true of the payroll tax: income is taxed as earned,
from wages, but the system makes no attempt whatsoever to track income from
wealth or savings. The simple reason for the parallelism is that an “income” tax with
Roth-style treatment of savings is a payroll tax—one that taxes wages and ignores
savings. Such a universal wage tax, of course, wildly favors those who do not actually
have to work for wages to support their lifestyles: those like America’s ever-growing
list of billionaires (well over 500 as I write)25 and ever-growing number of “dynastytrust babies,” who can live off their wealth, not wages.26
Each of Norquist’s five steps (in his own words; I have added just the numbers to
track the text better) is already well on its way to becoming reality: “[1] [a]bolish the
death tax, [2] abolish the capital gains tax, [3] expand IRAs so that all savings are
tax-free, [4] move to full expensing of business investment rather than long
depreciation schedules and [5] abolish the alternative minimum tax.”27 Each step has
proceeded incrementally, just as Norquist’s global strategy was meant to proceed
incrementally. In particular, the TCJA severely weakened the “death” tax (step 1) 28
as well as the alternative minimum tax (step 5),29 while moving towards expensing
of business investment (step 4).30 And as ordinary American wage earners continued

CHAP. L. REV. 197 (1999); Steve Forbes, The Tax Code: Make It Flat, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2014/03/07/the-tax-code-make-it-flat/#31880e2a7
e0e [https://perma.cc/HYG8-9QNE]; Daniel Mitchell & William Beach, How the ArmeyShelby Flat Tax Would Affect the Middle Class, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 12, 1996),
https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/how-the-armey-shelby-flat-tax-would-affect-the-mid
dle-class [https://perma.cc/W36R-TSCH].
24. Bill Bischoff, How the New Tax Law Created a ‘Perfect Storm’ for Roth IRA
Conversions in 2019, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com
/story/how-the-new-tax-law-creates-a-perfect-storm-for-roth-ira-conversions-2018-03-26
[https://perma.cc/4XRW-PX2A]; Amir El-Sibaie, What Rothification Means for Tax Reform,
TAX FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/what-rothification-means-for-taxreform/ [https://perma.cc/9KAS-JRCG].
25. Katie Sola & Emily Canal, Here Are the States with the Most Billionaires, FORBES
(Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katiesola/2016/03/05/here-are-the-states-withthe-most-billionaires/#13fb2cfc101e [https://perma.cc/2E38-V48G].
26. Edward J. McCaffery, Wealth Not Wages: The Fundamental Trick of Tax Policy,
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wealth-not-wages-the-fundament
al-trick-of-tax-policy_us_59ea5fd1e4b034105edd4e79
[https://perma.cc/XS72-2ZYF]
(updated Oct. 20, 2017, 5:27 PM).
27. Norquist, supra note 21.
28. Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the
TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/only-1700estates-would-owe-estate-tax-2018-under-tcja [https://perma.cc/3GWA-RN6Y].
29. Bill Bischoff, Meet the New, Friendlier Alternative Minimum Tax, MARKETWATCH
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/meet-the-new-friendlier-alternative
-minimum-tax-2018-02-26 [https://perma.cc/RMZ8-TUFC].
30. John Ohannessian & Stefanie Levit, Tax Reform: Enhanced Fixed Asset Expensing
Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, MAZARS (Feb. 9, 2018), https://mazarsledger.com/enhanced
-fixed-asset-expensing-under-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/3PD2-4KKW].
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to search for the $4000 of benefits that Trump promised them from Tax Cuts 1.0, 31
talk of Tax Cuts 2.0 featured reductions to the capital-gains rate, even by executive
regulatory action (step 2),32 and an expansion of IRAs—along the Roth model (step
3).33 At the end of this line, when all five of Norquist’s steps have been taken in full,
there will be no income tax as we know it, or one that can properly be called an
“income” tax: we will have arrived at a universal wage tax.
C. The Normative Stakes at Issue
To be clear, much has been gained as the death of the income tax plays out. The
simplifications to the tax system are popular, the administrative efficiencies of a
simpler tax are real, and so forth. This Article is not about parsing out blame for the
status quo, but it is worth noting, in passing at least, that it is not just conservatives
bent on a flat wage tax driving the policy changes. Liberals and progressives have
been especially wont to use the income tax as a vehicle for advancing social and
political ends—noble causes, perhaps, but ones that helped to make the income tax
unpopular and unwieldy.34 Whatever the causes or benefits of the income tax’s
demise, some very important things have been lost in its passing: in particular, the
very possibilities for politics and progressivity.
The payroll tax is again the guide—it rarely features as an issue in electoral
politics and is not, and never has been, meaningfully redistributive. Indeed, there are
compelling reasons, in both theory and practice, why a wage tax ought not to be too
progressive or feature overly high marginal tax rates on the upper income: this is a
lesson both of the late Nobel Laureate James Mirrlees, of optimal income tax fame,35
and of the academic and political advisor Arthur Laffer, of the “Laffer Curve” and
recent Presidential Medal of Honor fame.36 Thus AOC’s proposal to raise marginal

31. Heather Long, The Average American Family Will Get $4,000 from Tax Cuts, Trump
Team Claims, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2017/10/16/the-average-american-family-will-get-4000-from-tax-cuts-trump-teamclaims/?utm_term=.488f058e7357 [https://perma.cc/6DQQ-YP6X].
32. Newt Gingrich, Why THIS Must Happen Next in Trump’s Economic Revolution, FOX
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/08/08/newt-gingrich-why-thismust-happen-next-in-trump-s-economic-revolution.html [https://perma.cc/XD5A-72P9].
33. Laura Davison, In New Round of Tax Cuts, Retirement Changes Seen as Most Likely
to Pass, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2018, 3:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2018-07-18/in-tax-cuts-2-0-retirement-changes-seen-as-most-likely-to-pass [https://perma
.cc/T5QQ-9764].
34. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L.
REV. 233 (1999).
35. See J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); Sam Roberts, James Mirrlees, Whose Tax Model Earned a
Nobel, Dies at 82, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04
/obituaries/james-mirrlees-dead.html [https://perma.cc/U42T-WZNX].
36. Arthur Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future, HERITAGE FOUND. (June
1, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/the-laffer-curve-past-present-and-future
[https://perma.cc/442Y-HVWH]; Ian Schwartz, President Trump Presents the Presidential
Medal of Freedom to Arthur Laffer, REALCLEARPOLITICS (June 20, 2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/06/20/president_trump_presents_the_presiden
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tax rates faces a plausible objection that it will deter high-end labor effort, while
doing nothing at all for those who are already wealthy and do not have to work for
wages in the first place.
The death of the income tax as an income tax—as a tax that is meant to fall on
wealth as well as on wages—means a deep, structural, and likely long-lasting loss to
America. To its advocates such as Grover Norquist, the death will be the crowning
glory in the systematic disarmament of the state’s tools of redistribution. Once cut,
complex, progressive taxes on capital and the rich will be hard to raise.37 Taxes on
wages, in contrast, are easy to collect and raise—their broad base means modest rate
increases raise massive revenues, and their largely hidden structures keep the people
from complaining too much about seemingly small increases to them. We saw this
dynamic play out rather precisely under President Obama’s “fiscal cliff fix,” in 2012,
when the restoration of a temporary, two percent payroll tax cut brought in the bulk
of the revenues (specifically, $1 trillion over a ten year period) to close a fiscal gap
created in large part due to President George W. Bush’s reckless income tax cuts.38
As this all plays out, wealth will be systematically left off the hook for paying any of
the price of whatever civilization endures.
The income tax is not completely dead, yet. And it might never fully, literally die.
Like the story of the gift and estate, or so-called “death,” tax39 or like the slashing of
the corporate income tax—two taxes meant to fall on wealth not wages—the urincome tax may persist largely as a fig leaf giving cover to a tax system
fundamentally set up to tax wages, not wealth. It will be more symbolic than real and
more fodder for keeping money—lots of money—in politics. Meantime, ninety to
ninety-five percent of Americans will be facing a flattened and inescapable wage tax.
Tax will continue to be a deep part of the problem of exacerbating wealth inequality
in America and not any part of its solution. Meaningful possibilities for getting the
wealthy to pay a fair share into the collective will be dead in all but name.
We are almost at the funeral stage, though hope continues to spring eternal. New
ideas, such as AOC’s marginal-rate increase, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s recent
proposal for a federal wealth tax on fortunes in excess of $50 million40 and former
Vice President Biden’s proposal to repeal the “stepped-up basis” on death rule of
I.R.C. § 1014,41 bear promise of different things to come—of a real attempt to get
the wealthy to pay a fair share of tax. But for progress to obtain and endure, it is best
to understand the failures of past and present tax policy. These recent progressive

tial_medal_of_freedom_to_arthur_laffer.html [https://perma.cc/N3R2-J5EK].
37. Robert J. Shiller, Once Cut, Corporate Income Taxes Are Hard to Restore, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/business/big-war-to-raise-the-corp
orate-income-tax.html [https://perma.cc/795Y-GAE5].
38. See McCaffery, supra note 10, at 343–44.
39. This is discussed later in this Article in greater depth. See infra Section IV.B.3.
40. Sahil Kapur & Joe Weisenthal, Warren Faults ‘Captalism Without Rules’ in Pushing
Wealth Tax, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201901-30/warren-faults-capitalism-without-rules-in-pushing-wealth-tax [https://perma.cc/A3JV
-PBTY].
41. The RS Politics 2020 Democratic Primary Policy Guide, ROLLINGSTONE (July 31,
2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-lists/2020-democratic-candidates-iss
ues-policy-positions-820811/ [https://perma.cc/XZJ6-8LZK].
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proposals all work within an existing paradigm of taxing income-plus-wealth that
has existed on the books in America for over a century. It is not working, as this
Article argues. Sometimes paradigms must shift, and new tools need to be crafted for
old and intransigent problems. Furthering this intellectual project along is a main
goal of this Article.
This is an important political and legal story. Let us go through it step by step, as
they say.
II. THE SCRIPT
To fully understand the death of the income tax, we need some background in
diverse disciplines including political economy, history, and, not least, tax law and
theory. The complexities of the subject matter help obscure its basic and profound
truths—a major part of the reason that the murder can take place in broad daylight. I
will keep the main discussion as simple and welcoming as possible, for the technical
details tend to obscure the basic truths. More complexity can be found by following
sources in the footnotes.
A. The Producers: Wealth and Wages
There are two major forces at work throughout our story: capital and labor, the
two great factors of production in a modern capitalist economy. All wealth comes,
ultimately, from one’s labor or from one’s capital: people earn wealth either by
working for it or by using their assets (money, machines, land, buildings, intellectual
property, and so forth), for which they are paid rents or profits.
Political economists from John Stuart Mill to Karl Marx and beyond have used
this vocabulary.42 The contemporary French economist Thomas Piketty recently
published a major work, Capital in the 21st Century, collecting vast reams of data to
paint a picture of the state of capital and labor today.43 The quick bottom line: capital
is winning. The world has more capital than ever, more unequally held. The Western
world is at, and is soon to exceed, levels of capital accumulation and inequality not
seen since the Gilded Age of the early twentieth century—a moment in time that
boded ill for Western civilization. Labor, meantime, has been losing: wages have
been stagnating for some time, and labor’s share of the national income has been in
steady decline for decades, as Figure 1 illustrates.44

42. See generally KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1848); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848).
43. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013); accord EDWARD
J. MCCAFFERY, THE MEANING OF CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2016).
44. Jonathan Rothwell, Make Elite Compete: Why the 1% Earn So Much and What to Do
About It, BROOKINGS (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/make-elites-com
pete-why-the-1-earn-so-much-and-what-to-do-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/J76H-AMW8].
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Figure 1: Labor Share of the National Income, 1948–201845
Wage and Salary Employee Compensation as a Share of the Gross
Domestic Income

In part because “capital” and “labor” have connotations of Marxism and
unpleasant undergraduate lectures, I will generally use the simpler, more colloquial
terms of wealth and wages. “Wealth” refers to the value of all of one’s assets, minus
debts or liabilities; “wages” refer to paychecks, income from labor. In 2017, the
average American worker received wages of just under $45,000 per year.46 The
average income (from capital and labor, combined) of the top one percent of
households in America was about $430,000, while the average wealth of the top one
percent was over $10,300,000.47 Wealth inequality, in other words, is far more severe
than wage inequality. To have some real examples in mind, Warren Buffett has a net
worth, a wealth, of $85 billion ($85,000,000,000) as I write;48 his salary as the chief
executive officer of Berkshire Hathaway is $100,000.49 The late Steve Jobs, who died

45. Shares of Gross Domestic Income: Compensation of Employees, Paid: Wage and
Salary Accruals: Disbursements: To Persons, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W270RE1A156NBEA [https://perma.cc/FLW8-KVY2] (last
updated Aug. 29, 2019).
46. Alison Doyle, Average Salary Information for US Workers, BALANCE CAREERS,
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/average-salary-information-for-us-workers-2060808
[https://perma.cc/SBZ3-MGK5] (last updated May 10, 2019).
47. PK, Who Are the One Percent in the United States by Income and Net Worth?,
DQYDJ, https://dqydj.com/who-are-the-one-percent-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/BU3P
-YFWL] (last updated Oct. 10, 2019).
48. Tanza Loudenback, 24 Mind-Blowing Facts About Warren Buffett and His $84.7
Billion Fortune, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/facts-about
-warren-buffett-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/SPW8-2BZ6].
49. Sarah Berger, Warren Buffett Has Been Making the Same Salary for Decades—and
It’s Surprisingly Low, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/warren
-buffetts-berkshire-hathaway-salary.html [https://perma.cc/3LC4-J2TD].
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in 2011 with a wealth of $10 billion,50 did Buffett one hundred thousand better:
Jobs’s annual wages from Apple, the company he founded, were $1.51
Wealth and wages are the producers in a capitalist economy, and they are the
dueling players in the tax saga that will end in the income tax’s death. It is important
to understand that this is not a battle between “rich” and “poor,” but rather a battle
between a specific type of “rich”—those that have wealth and do not need wages—
and everyone else. Most significantly, it is not a battle between “upper” income and
“lower” income. There is much confusion here, as anti-income tax advocates like to
point to statistics showing that upper-income persons pay most of the income tax and
that the income tax is therefore, if anything, too progressive.52
As often in the public political presentation of tax, there are fiscal optical illusions
at work. What we see is not the full story. The income tax system appears progressive
on its face, as those with higher incomes pay higher income taxes. But there are
illusions at both ends of the income scale. On the low end, the usual claim ignores
the payroll tax, which falls on wages beginning with the first dollar of them. On the
high end, where the wealthy live, looking at “income” fails to capture the hugely
significant unrealized appreciation of the wealthy, who do not have to report their
true economic income as “income” on any tax form, as we shall discuss below. 53
Under the universal wage tax, as we shall see, Americans who work regular jobs for
a living face a flattened and inescapable wage tax. The payroll tax provides the lower
brackets, the wage/income tax the higher brackets: when combined, these rates
flatten out considerably (see Figures 13 and 14, below, if you want to peek ahead).
Meantime, those with wealth, who do not depend on wages for their lifestyle, can
avoid all tax—and do not show up in the picture at all.
The reorientation involved in looking at matters of tax through the lens of wealth
and wages, capital and labor, is Copernican. It answers the paradox confronting
AOC: raising rates on millionaires does nothing to billionaires. The new focus allows
us to see a universal wage tax structure that is surprisingly flat and virtually
inescapable. This is what labor faces. All workers are taxed, and rather heavily. This
stands in contrast to all taxes on wealth (the corporate income, gift and estate, and
ur-income taxes), the coproducer of the economy. These taxes are low, when they
fall at all, and are virtually voluntary all of the time.

50. Andrew Beattie, Steve Jobs and the Apple Story, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun 30, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/university/steve-jobs-biography/steve-jobs-net-worth.asp
[https://perma.cc/L6S9-6J8A].
51. Why Did Steve Jobs Only Make $1 a Year? (and What Can You Learn From It),
MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.fool.com/personal-finance/2014/02/01/why-didsteve-jobs-only-make-1-a-year-and-what-you.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z8F7-9CCL]. Jobs was
far from alone. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Tax-Smart Billionaires Who Work for $1, FORBES
(Apr. 5, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/04/05/tax-smart-billionaires
-who-work-for-1/#77894ad6dfee [https://perma.cc/4GHN-VMMC].
52. Laura Saunders, Top 20% of Americans Will Pay 87% of Income Tax, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-20-of-americans-will-pay-87-of-income
-tax-1523007001 [https://perma.cc/ET2W-B4EN].
53
See infra Section III.B.
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Thus the wealth-wage distinction allows us to see the fatal problem with
Democratic or liberal tax policy in the post-World War II (“post-War”) era: because
taxes fall primarily on wages, redistribution, if any, has to occur from more highly
paid to lower paid workers or to the nonworking poor. The middle class is pitted
against the lower class while the upper class sits on the sidelines. This is not a recipe
for social stability.
Wealth and wages have often been on separate paths throughout history, but the
present trajectories point to pressing and looming social, political, and economic
perils. In short and in sum, while wealth is still winning, wages are now losing. As
Piketty and others have abundantly documented, the rich are getting richer as capital
takes a greater share of the social economic pie. Global forces such as free trade and,
more importantly, automation bring pressure on wages or eliminate the need for
human workers altogether while benefiting capital. While the rich have been getting
richer, wages have been stagnating.
1. A Quick Flashback
It has not always been as it is now between wealth and wages. There have been
periods of history when capital and labor moved in tandem, sharing equally in
society’s productive gains. This is not the world that Figure 1 points to for the
present. Figure 1 shows that labor’s share of GDP has been falling steadily in the
post-War era, falling from over 50% in the late 1960s to just over 40% more recently.
This means that some 10% of the annual national income—more than $2 trillion in
2018, given a GDP of $20.5 trillion54—has shifted from labor to capital over this
time period.
Now this could be so because the national income was growing so fast that labor,
despite its smaller share of the pie, was better off: that is, it could be the case that
50% of the 2010 pie is a better deal than 60% of the 1970 one. Were this so, the
wealthy would still be getting much wealthier—after all, their 50% of the (larger)
2010 social pie is clearly better than their 40% of the (smaller) 1970 pie. But perhaps
labor is gaining, too, just not as quickly.
Figure 2 casts considerable doubt on that happy tale. This Figure, prepared by the
nonpartisan Economic Policy Institute, shows the average hourly wage growth,
adjusted for inflation, for ordinary (nonsupervisory) workers on one line and national
productivity on the other, for the period from 1948–2011. The chart is helpfully
divided in two at the year 1973. For the period from 1948–1973, wealth and wages
were in virtual lockstep. These were rebuilding years, with plenty of need for labor
and capital as America emerged from the cataclysms of economic depression and
war. Things changed starting around 1973. Wages essentially flattened, while overall
productivity continued its skyrocketing trajectory. That means that these years, of
internet booms and automation and global marketplaces, were very good overall, but
ordinary labor—wages—was not going along on the ride. The rich were getting
richer, in other words, without pulling workers along with them. Capital and labor,

54. Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter and Annual 2018 (Initial Estimate),
BEAGOV (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/initial-gross-domestic-product
-4th-quarter-and-annual-2018 [https://perma.cc/475D-7X88].
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happily married during the immediate post-War phase, have been divorced for some
time now.
Figure 2: Wage Growth and Productivity, 1948–201755
Gap Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Compensation
from 1948–2017

Figure 3 confirms this sense, focusing on the impacts of inflation. Since the 1960s,
American wages have essentially been flat in constant-dollar (here, in 2019) terms.

55. The Productivity—Pay Gap, ECON. POLICY INST., https://www.epi.org/productivity
-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/47G9-EKG8] (last updated July 2019).
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Figure 3: Hourly Wages for Production and Nonsupervisory Employees, Nominally
and Adjusted for Inflation56
HOURLY WAGES FOR PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES

2. Back to Tax
Tax, which could and arguably should be addressing and correcting for the
growing gap between wealth and wages—by taxing wealth more and wages less—
has been doing precisely the opposite. Taxes are falling more heavily on wages, less
heavily on wealth, even in the face of macroeconomic forces vastly favoring wealth.
Our central story, of the slow death of the income tax as an income tax, is a leading
cause of this perversity.
B. The Staging: All About the Base
Any tax consists of a simple product of a “rate,” or how much is being taxed,
times a “base,” or what is being taxed. The bifurcation of political issues between
base and rates is key to our tale. The income tax has always depended on a series of
progressive marginal rates that have contributed to its complexity and unpopularity:
AOC waded into this thicket. But our story of the income tax’s death turns on the
base, or the “what” of taxation, in the first instance. Norquist’s dream in five easy

56. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES0500000008 [https://perma.cc/2EPG-83CT] (last modified
May 14, 2020, 7:41 PM), converted through CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl [https://perma.cc/EF5T-YKP4].
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pieces is about changing the base of the income tax into a wage one.57 The question
of rates will be dealt with separately, using another bifurcation—between the payroll
and “income” taxes—to effect a significant optical illusion. We will get to that after
the main tale.
Back to the base. There are three major choices of base for a comprehensive tax—
one meant to apply to wide ranges of individuals and to collect significant revenues.
These taxes fall on the flow of funds into and out of households, as opposed to those
taxes, such as property or pure “wealth” taxes, that fall on assets or on static stocks
of wealth—for example, Senator Warren has announced plans for an annual wealth
tax on fortunes in excess of fifty million dollars.58 In the flow of funds, money comes
into a household from wages and/or the returns on wealth. What comes in goes out,
in the form of either spending or savings. In the traditional language of tax policy:
Capital + Labor → Income = Consumption + Savings.59
In words, the returns to capital (wealth) and labor (wages) come into a household and
thus constitute “income.” Whatever comes in is either spent (consumption) or not
(savings): the two categories of outputs from a household.
An income tax, by definition and in theory, is supposed to tax both wealth and
wages, capital and labor, the two sources of income on the left-hand side of the above
relation. As the Supreme Court put it in the seminal case of Eisner v. Macomber,
decided in 1920, “[i]ncome may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined.”60
In choosing to tax both wealth and wages, income taxes have long been criticized
for being a so-called double tax, going back at least as far as John Stuart Mill in
1848.61 The reason is simple to understand. Consider two taxpayers, Ant and
Grasshopper, each of whom earn $100 from a day at work, in wages. Grasshopper
spends all of his money before he goes to sleep, as is his wont. Ant, on the other
hand, saves a portion of her wealth, as is her wont. When Ant’s savings yield a
return—interest, rent, dividends—she has a point in complaining that she is being
harmed by her thrift under an income tax. Why should she pay tax twice, when she
and Grasshopper have each earned the same amount initially, and Ant is only earning
more money on account of her thrift?
The criticism of the income tax as a “double tax” on savings has led economists
and others to advocate for “single” taxes, which apply only once in the flow of a

57. See supra text accompanying note 27.
58. Naomi Jagoda, Warren Stakes out 2020 Ground with Wealth-Tax Proposal, THE HILL
(Jan. 27, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/427075-warren-courts-progressives-with
-wealth-tax-proposal [https://perma.cc/4NUX-RTZP].
59. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
60. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
61. See generally MILL, supra note 42.
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household’s funds.62 This is Norquist and company’s quest for a tax “which taxes
income one time.”63
There are two major choices of single taxes, each of which can properly be called
a “consumption” tax. One tax applies when income is first earned, and never again.
This type of tax has been called a “prepaid” consumption tax, but we can call it by a
simpler name: a “wage tax.” The second type of consumption tax falls when, and
only when, an individual spends money on herself. This type of tax has been called
a “postpaid” consumption or a “consumed income” tax, but again we can use a
simpler term: a “spending tax.”
Much ink has been spent explaining the similarities and differences among
income and consumption taxes.64 In theory, prepaid and postpaid, or wage and
spending, taxes lead to the same place under certain conditions. But this is not an
article about tax theory or about the intellectual history of tax.65 This Article concerns
practical politics and the possibilities for the sharing of government burdens between
capital and labor, wealth and wages. Consider how the different taxes affect wealth
and wages. As a practical matter, there is no doubt that an income tax, in theory and
by definition, is meant to fall on both wealth and wages. There is also no doubt that
a wage tax falls only on wages, never on wealth. A spending tax, in contrast, can fall
on wealth, when wealth is used to finance consumption.66
Consider our friend Grasshopper again. Grasshopper earns his $100 of wages and,
just before he has spent his last cent, he buys a lottery ticket. He gets lucky, and the
ticket pays off $10,000. How do the three taxes affect him? Suppose all taxes have a
flat 30% rate, just to illustrate (and to foreshadow a bit). An income tax falls first on
Grasshopper’s wages, taking 30%, or $30, from his $100. Then, when Grasshopper’s
lottery ticket hits, the income tax taxes him again, taking 30%, or $3000, of his
$10,000 winnings, leaving him with $7000 to consume. A wage tax taxes
Grasshopper’s wages, taking $30 from his $100, but then ignores the lottery
winnings, so Grasshopper gets to keep his full $10,000. Finally, a spending tax would
not tax Grasshopper’s wages, so he gets to keep his full initial $100 of pay, until he
spends them and pays his $30. But when Grasshopper goes to spend his $10,000
lottery winnings, he also must pay a 30% tax, or $3000, leaving him with $7000 of
personal spending.
In sum: the wage tax, and the wage tax alone, allows Grasshopper to keep and
spend his entire “windfall” from his “investment” in the lottery ticket.67
This simple example shows that the single taxes of wage and spending taxes are
different, because they fall at different times. Wage taxes completely ignore savings:
savings are irrelevant to how much payroll taxes one pays, for example. Spending
taxes, in contrast, do fall on “windfalls” from capital: what is irrelevant under a

62. See generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, The uncertain case against the double taxation of
corporate income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613 (1990).
63. Norquist, supra note 21.
64. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807 (2005).
65. C.f. id.
66. See id. at 822.
67. See McCaffery, supra note 10, at 327–28 (discussing windfalls).
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spending tax is where the money to spend came from (wealth, wages, gift, loan, or
otherwise).68
With just this small taste of tax theory behind us, it should come as no surprise
that conservatives have aimed to transform the “income” tax—a tax which is meant
to fall on both wealth and wages, to the extent of “double” taxing savings—into a
“single” tax. Nor should it be a surprise that the preferred single tax has emerged to
be the wage-tax model—recall that an “income” tax with unlimited Roth-style
treatment of savings is a wage tax.69 This is the death of the income tax. The end of
days for the income tax lies with a universal wage tax.
This is why our main story is all about the base. It turns on the relatively quiet,
hidden transformation of the “income” tax into a wage tax. This proceeds along
Norquist’s charted course, starting with wages. We systematically eliminate all
additions to wages by allowing for tax-free savings and no capital-gains tax, and we
also eliminate all subtractions, or deductions, from wages by limiting business
deductions and repealing the personal ones. We wake up with an “income” tax that
has only wages in its base, and then we discover a flattened rate structure on labor
under the universal wage tax.
C. The Players: The Big Three of Taxes
Figure 4, below, taken from official government data, shows the history of the
principal sources of federal revenues normalized as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) from 1950 to 2016. Figure 5 puts into a pie chart the data from the
single year 2016. Both charts clearly show that there are and have long been three
major taxes financing the federal government: the individual income, the payroll, and
the corporate income taxes. In 2016, for example, these three taxes accounted for
more than 90% of the government’s revenues; the other portion in the pie chart
consists of “excise, estate, and other taxes,” which specifically includes sales of
government assets—a large residual category. In sum, the “Big Three” of individual
income, payroll, and corporate income taxes warrant our primary focus, although we
comment a bit on the estate, or so-called “death,” tax, below.

68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
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Figure 4: Major Sources of Federal Revenue as Percentages of GDP, 1950–201870
Federal Tax Receipts by Source as a Share of National GDP, 1950–2018

To dispense with a concern that some readers might have upfront, payroll taxes
are indeed “taxes,” as their revenues are available for general government purposes.
Payroll taxes are not, that is, set aside in any special account dedicated for specific
workers to use in their old age or retirement.71 The government both collects
revenues and spends them, and the two sides of fiscal politics are not necessarily
connected.
Another common misunderstanding of payroll taxes is that the employee only
pays, or “contributes” (payroll taxes tend to be called social security and Medicare
“contributions” under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)),72 one-half of
the total. The employee’s “share” of social security taxes is 6.2% of her wages, up to
a ceiling of $128,000 in 2018; her share of Medicare taxes is 1.45%, with no cap, for
a total employee share of 7.65%.73 The employer pays a matching “share,” another
7.65%.74 But economists attribute all 15.3% to the employee, for the simple reason
that when an employer pays a worker $100 in wages, he must also pay the

70. Historical Tables, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov
/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/P92H-VE9C] (Table 2.3).
71. See John Olson, What Are Payroll Taxes and Who Pays Them?, TAX FOUND. (July
25, 2016) (citing Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)), https://taxfoundation.org/what-arepayroll-taxes-and-who-pays-them/ [https://perma.cc/89LQ-C7AB].
72. Topic No. 751 Social Security and Medicare Withholding Rates, IRS, https://www.irs
.gov/taxtopics/tc751 [https://perma.cc/L7B2-GS3B] (last updated Feb. 14, 2020).
73. See Olson, supra note 71.
74. Id.
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government $7.65 in the employer’s share—and that is money owed on account of
the employee’s working, which could otherwise be given straight to the worker.75
The federal government now, rather to its credit, simply reports the entire 15.3%
burden as part of the payroll tax, as Figure 4 does, and as we shall use throughout.76
We can learn much from Figure 4. By starting in 1950, Figure 4 considers only
the modern post-War economy and government. Before this time, as we shall discuss
briefly below, the overall tax burden was much smaller, and the individual income
tax in particular was, during the period before World War II, far less significant.
Since 1950, on the other hand, the overall federal tax burden as a percentage of GDP
has remained remarkably constant, moving within a band of 15%–20% of the
economy (as shown in Figure 6). What changes—and what is a focus of the analysis
in this Article—is the composition of the total, the relative shares of the Big Three.

75. Id.
76. Technically, an adjustment needs to be made to keep the tax rates constant between
the amount of wages earned and payroll taxes, as both bases are tax inclusive. If Ant earns
$100 in wages, it is true that her employer will have to remit $15.30 in payroll taxes. But only
$7.65, one-half of this total, comes out of the $100. The other $7.65 is a shadow wage of sorts.
So Ant “really” got $107.65 in pay, $15.30 of which was paid to the government for payroll
taxes. This would make Ant’s payroll tax rate 14.2% on a tax-inclusive basis (where the tax
itself is included in the denominator, that is, $15.3/$107.65). The text uses the more common
15.3% for simplicity.
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Figure 5: Sources of Federal Tax Revenue, 201677
Sources of Federal Tax Revenue, 2016

Figure 6: Federal Tax Receipts (Total) as Percentage of GDP, 1945–201878
Federal Tax Receipts as a Percentage of GDP, 1945–2018
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D. The Plot: Towards a Universal Wage Tax
Before we look at trends over time, consider how the Big Three taxes fit into the
prior brief discussion of tax bases. The individual income tax is in theory meant to
fall on both wealth and wages, all income derived “from labor or from capital or from
both combined,” as Macomber put it.79 The payroll tax is, of course, a tax only on
wages and the model for what the income tax is becoming. Finally, the corporate
income tax, although its ultimate incidence is unclear,80 is a tax on wealth or capital
in the first instance. This is because the corporate income tax is a tax on all of the
corporation’s income minus the wages it pays, which are subtractions from income
under I.R.C. § 162.81 Just as the payroll tax is a wage tax, the corporate income tax
is a nonwage tax.
Now focus on what happens to the Big Three taxes over the time period reflected
in Figure 4. Compare in particular the two years 1952 and 2016. In 1952, the Big
Three’s shares, listed as Individual Income/Corporate Income/Payroll, were 7.8%,
5.9%, and 1.8%, respectively, for a total tax burden of 15.5% of GDP. In 2016, those
same shares were 8.4%, 1.6% and 6.0%, for a total of 16% of GDP. The total reflects
a modest increase in the aggregate tax burden from these three taxes; as Figure 6
shows, the aggregate tax burden of all federal taxes has been fairly constant since the
dawn of the post-War period. (In fact, “Hauser’s Law,” named after the investment
analyst William Hauser, holds that federal tax revenues since World War II are
always approximately 19.5% of GDP, regardless of marginal rates.)82 But the
dramatic story is the near total inversion of the corporate income and payroll tax
shares, from 5.9% and 1.8% in 1952, to 1.6% and 6.0% by 2016. In sum, the share
of the pure wage tax increased over these decades by 4.2% of GDP, while the share
of the corporate income tax, the pure nonwage tax, fell by 4.3% of GDP—a nearly
perfect swap from nonwage to wage taxation.
Figure 4 shows that this inversion is not an artifact of choosing two particular
years, 1952 and 2016. The trends are quite pronounced. The corporate income tax
steadily falls throughout the decades shown in Figure 4, and the payroll tax steadily
rises. Among the Big Three taxes, the marginal rates under the payroll tax alone have
never been cut, except for the two-year period of President Obama’s payroll tax
holiday in 2011 and 2012 (as seen in Figure 7).
These trends help show how the United States could emerge with a wage-tax
system, given where we started in 1950: we completely inverted the relative roles of
the corporate income and payroll taxes during this time period. This then leaves the

77.
78.
79.
80.

Historical Tables, supra note 70 (Table 2.3).
Id. (Table 2.3).
252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Edward McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Capital Taxation, TAX
NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2012), https://tax.network/emccaffery/the-uneasy-case-for-capital-taxat
ion/ [https://perma.cc/2MN5-EPDZ].
81. I.R.C. § 162 (2018).
82. W. Kurt Hauser, There’s No Escaping Hauser’s Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703514904575602943209741952
[https://perma.cc/MZ29-XNU].
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individual income tax, which has remained notably steady during this post-War
period as a percentage of GDP, as Figure 4 shows.
Figure 7: Payroll Tax Rate History, 1937–201783
Payroll Tax Rate History, 1937–2017

Figure 8: Highest Marginal Rate Under Income Tax, 1913–201884
Highest Marginal Tax Rate, 1913–2018

The yield of the income tax hovers around 8% of GDP; any significant rise above
that level, as we saw in the 1970s (partly due to inflation) or in the 1990s (partly due
to the Internet and stock market booms), is followed by tax cuts, as we saw in the
1980s under President Ronald Reagan or in the early 2000s under President George
W. Bush. Unlike the virtually monotonic increase in rates and overall burdens under

83. Payroll Tax Rates, TAX POLICY CTR. (July 18, 2019), https://www.taxpolicy
center.org/statistics/payroll-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/MZ3A-FDTC].
84. Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POLICY CTR. (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates
[https://perma.cc/3W8M-DCCT].
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the payroll tax, rates under the individual income tax have frequently been cut and
occasionally been raised over the post-War period, as Figure 8 illustrates: the income
tax, unlike the payroll tax, has been a political “football” during the decades, kicked
around by lawmakers, lobbyists, and their paying patrons.
The individual income tax accounted for about one-half of all federal revenues
from the Big Three during this post-War period. Whereas we have just commented
on the switch from corporate income to payroll taxes—a movement strengthened by
the TCJA, which steeply cut corporate income taxes85—the individual income tax’s
role in the story follows a different path. The individual income tax is too big to fail
or simply to be eliminated. Instead, the story of the death of the individual income
tax is a story of the steady erosion of its base and of its transformation into a wage
tax: Norquist’s quest.
Once again, the income tax is supposed to fall on both wealth and wages. But it
has never been all that serious about falling on wealth, and this trend has accelerated
as of late.86 This is the death of which we write—the death of the tax as a true income
tax, falling equally on capital and labor. The income tax will still be called an
“income” tax. Why not? Old taxes are good taxes as they say.87 But there will be two
distinct regimes within the “income” tax. For the vast majority of Americans, some
ninety-five percent, mainly wage earners, the tax will be simple to pay but impossible
to avoid. For a growing minority of America’s rich capable of living off wealth alone,
the ur-income tax, just like the lingering death tax, will still have its formal
complexities. But it will not have many substantive teeth. Taxation for the wealthy
will be complex but avoidable.
With the corporate income tax reduced to a bare fraction of its past load, with the
payroll tax bolstered and here to stay, and with the individual income tax stripped of
its abilities to tax wealth but not wages, the work of the conservative assault on the
tools of redistribution will be at its natural end. The Big Three taxes will become
cover for a burdensome and inescapable wage tax.
E. A Short Before the Feature: The Near Death of the Death Tax
Before moving on to the feature story—the transformation of the income tax into
a wage tax—we take a few moments to consider a smaller story playing out on rather
precisely parallel tracks. This is the tale of the U.S. wealth transfer tax system, also
known as the gift, estate, and generation-skipping tax system, or, more colloquially,
as the “death tax.” The careful reader will recall that killing the death tax was one of
Norquist’s five easy pieces towards a flat wage tax.88
The gift, estate, and generation-skipping tax system was intended to fall on the
gratuitous transfer of wealth, whether that be during life (the gift tax) or after a death
(the estate tax). The taxes fall only on wealth at the moment of its passing. Thus, just
as with the corporate income tax, another nonwage tax, we would predict estate taxes
to be declining in significance as the wider American tax system becomes a wage-

85.
86.
87.
88.

See infra Section V.B.2.
See McCaffery, supra note 10, at 328.
See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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based one. And so they are. Figure 9 shows estate and gift tax revenues as a
percentage of total federal revenues—not GDP—demonstrating both that revenues
have been declining in the post-War era and that they are hardly significant today.
Figure 9: Estate and Gift Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Federal Receipts
1940–201889
Estate and Gift Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Government
Receipts, 1940–2018

It is clear that the wealth transfer tax system has never been a major source of
revenue. Nor are many even subject to it, as Figure 10 shows.
Figure 10: Taxable Estate Tax Returns as Percentage of Adult Deaths, 1934–201390
Percentage of Adult Deaths with a Taxable Estate

89. Historical Tables, supra note 70 (Tables 2.1 and 2.5).
90. Fiscal Facts, TAX POLICY CTR. (July 10, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/fiscal-fact/historical-returns-percentage-deaths [https://perma.cc/3PQ5-RPN9].
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Strikingly, neither Figures 9 nor 10 reflect the changes enacted under the TCJA,
which raised the exemption, or “zero bracket” of the gift and estate tax, to over $11
million for individuals and over $22 million for married couples, indexed for
inflation. Under these levels, some 99.8% of Americans do not even have to worry
about their successors’ needing to fill out forms for the death tax.
It is past time to give a shout out to two academic commentators on the estate tax
saga, Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, who published the book Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing Inherited Wealth in 2005,91 very much
anticipating this present Article. Graetz and Shapiro chronicled well the steady
erosion of the wealth-transfer tax system—another hallmark of progressive politics,
another attempt to tax wealth, not wages. The tax has long been considered a
“voluntary tax,”92 because the wealthy and sophisticated can readily avoid it with
complex planning. The casino magnate and conservative financier Sheldon Adelson,
for example, was able to get $8 billion out of his taxable estate at a time when the
official exemption level was about $1 million;93 President Trump’s then chief
economic advisor, Gary Cohen, candidly stated his view that only “morons” pay the
estate tax as the TCJA was coming into form.94
Graetz and Shapiro expertly chronicle decades of legislative, regulatory, and
judicial decisions and actions that continually struck blows at the integrity of the
wealth-transfer tax system.95 The authors were technically wrong, or at least
premature, to herald the “death” of the death tax.96 Significantly, even the TCJA,
while rendering the wealth-transfer tax system moot for all but a small fraction of the
top one percent of Americans, did not literally kill the tax. But this minor semantic
detail only helps to underscore the relevance of Graetz and Shapiro’s important
account to our present effort, for the script on the death tax is strikingly parallel to
the story of the killing of the income tax. In the more than a decade since Death by a
Thousand Cuts was published, the tax has continued to be cut—its exemption levels
going up under President Obama and then again, and dramatically, under President
Trump and the TCJA. The tax, while alive, is on life support. The tax is also unlikely
to ever come back in anything like its original intended role: the exemption level

91. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
92. See generally GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX? NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
SOPHISTICATED ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE (1979); George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977); Edward
McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? Revisited, 93 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 268 (2000).
93. Zachary R. Mider, Accidental Tax Break Saves Wealthiest American $100 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-17/acci
dental-tax-break-saves-wealthiest-americans-100-billion [https://perma.cc/KFU2-Y8LY].
94. Robert Frank, ‘Only Morons Pay the Estate Tax,’ Says White House’s Gary Cohn,
CNBC (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/29/only-morons-pay-the-estate-taxsays-white-houses-gary-cohn.html [https://perma.cc/MVU3-CKEK]; see also Edward
McCaffery, Tax Breaks for Multi-Millionaire Morons, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/tax-breaks-for-multi-millionaire-morons_b_59f9f06ae4b0b7
f0915f635d [https://perma.cc/WKZ7-A4PG].
95. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 91.
96. Id. at 3–4.
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under the estate tax has never been lowered, except for a slight technical adjustment
in 1933 to coordinate the gift and estate tax levels.97
This is a harbinger of the death of the income tax, too. The death tax has not and
will not formally die. But the tax is irrelevant for the vast majority of Americans and
easily avoidable by the handful still potentially subject to it who are willing to pay
to play tax-avoidance games.
Why keep the much-reviled death tax hanging around at all? Aside from the
symbolism of the government’s maintaining the appearance of being serious about
taxing wealth, the persistence of the death tax does an important service: it provides
cover to the perpetuation of a key provision in the individual income tax, the
“stepped-up basis” on death rule of I.R.C. § 1014 (this is the provision that Vice
President Biden has pledged to repeal if elected).98 We shall consider this provision,
wittily dubbed the “Angel of Death” law,99 further below: it provides the third step
in the three-step guide to avoiding all income tax on wealth, Buy/Borrow/Die.
Stepped-up basis for assets acquired from a decedent has long been justified as being
fair in a world where wealthy decedents pay an estate tax.100 Today, 99.8% of
decedents do not have to worry about their estates paying a tax. Yet 100% of heirs
will get stepped-up basis on the assets that they inherit.
The estate tax story is just a warm-up, a trial balloon. It perfectly foreshadows the
income tax tale. The near death of the death tax is, in itself, an important element of
the wider central story, because, like the decline of the corporate income tax, it is
about the fall of a tax on wealth. As we consider the individual income tax, we should
be under no illusion that there is some magical tax offstage, such as the estate or
corporate income taxes, to miraculously solve all of our problems, to address the
failures to tax wealth more vigorously.101 The forces favoring wealth have already
killed the estate tax for all intents and purposes, leaving just the good part (the
stepped-up basis) and not much else, except employment for financiers of dynasty
trusts and lobbyists. We will see the same techniques emerging under the reform of
the income tax. One, create a simple wage/income tax for the masses, providing most
of the federal revenue and allowing a smaller tax on the rich, the ur-income tax, to
emerge as a separate matter. Then, two, continually make changes to the smaller,
weaker tax that only applies to the wealthiest few—a tax where changes can go
unnoticed except by lobbyists and those who pay them, because the revenue effects
are modest and the number of taxpayer targets is limited. This ur-income tax will be
ripe for the killing by a thousand cuts. There will be no reason to formally announce
its death and there will be plenty of reasons to keep the tax hanging around on life

97. See Julie Garber, Federal Estate Tax Exemptions 1997 Through 2019, THE BALANCE
(Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/exemption-from-federal-estate-taxes-3505630
[https://perma.cc/WD6Y-T8R6].
98. The RS Politics 2020 Democratic Primary Policy Guide, supra note 41.
99. McCaffery, supra note 10, at 320.
100. Scott Eastman, The Trade-offs of Repealing Step-Up in Basis, TAX FOUNDATION (Mar.
13, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/step-up-in-basis/ [https://perma.cc/LLB5-MF7B];
Stephen J. Entin, The President Proposes a Second Tax on Estates, TAX FOUNDATION (Jan.
23, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/president-proposes-second-tax-estates/ [https://perma.cc
/E58Z-GHEP].
101. See id. at 311.
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support—to serve the ends of politicians, financiers, and the wealthy who pay them
both.
Now on with the show.
III. ACT ONE: ORIGIN STORIES, FEATURING ACHILLES’ HEELS
Figure 4 and the analysis above took off in the post-World War II period, starting
around 1950. The individual income tax’s contribution to federal revenues has been
fairly stable throughout this post-War period, always taking home the gold as the
single most important tax of the Big Three even as the corporate income and payroll
taxes switched places for the silver and bronze medals. It was not always so. As we
go through the story of the individual income tax’s transformation into a wage tax,
we start at the beginning, and we follow the story of taxes on wealth and wages.
A. The Income Tax Comes of Age
The income tax was conceived as a modest tax on wealth and the wealthy. When
times called for more revenue—much more revenue by World War II—the still
young “class” income tax got married to the masses of wage earners, becoming,
largely, a wage tax.
1. Baby Steps: The Sixteenth Amendment and a Modest Tax on Wealth
The modern income tax was born in 1913 following the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.102 America had used an income tax
during the Civil War under President Abraham Lincoln and then again in the
Progressive Era of the 1890s. But the latter tax was struck down, precisely because
it fell on capital (without apportionment) as well as on wages—it was the capital part
that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional.103 Thus, the movement to ratify the
Sixteenth Amendment was specifically and intentionally a movement to tax wealth.
The sponsors of the law were well aware of Mill’s criticism of an income tax as a
“double tax” on income that was saved. They wanted that.104
But they did not want much of that. Although the individual income tax was
enabled by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress actually enacted
the income tax in the Revenue Act of 1913, also known as the Tariff Act.105 The
law’s cuts to tariffs or excise taxes were its most politically and economically
significant provisions. The income tax went into effect with a top marginal rate of
1%, albeit with “surcharges” for higher incomes that created a top marginal rate
bracket of 7% for households reporting over $500,000 in income.106 To put these

102. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
103. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
104. See SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY: REVENUE AND POLITICS
45–53 (1996); ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1861–1913 (1993); McCaffery, supra note 64, at 810.
105. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
106. Id. § 2, 38 Stat. at 166–67.
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numbers in contemporary terms, $500,000 in 1913 is equivalent to over $13.1 million
($13,161,785) in 2020 dollars, according to the government’s inflation calculator.107
The 7% marginal rate applying to such people, if any existed, is less than the state
and local sales tax rate in some twenty states today.108 All in, less than one percent
(1%) of Americans paid individual income taxes in 1913,109 and the tax was a trivial
component of government revenues.
This original modern income tax did not tax much, but it did tax wealth.
Government statistics going back to 1913 fail to specifically report “wages and
salaries” as a category of income in the first three years of the tax, 1913–1915.110 In
1916, the first year for which statistics are available, “wages and salary” accounted
for less than 30% of all income reported under the income tax.111 While this ratio
varied in the earlier years of the income tax, it stayed lower than current times: wages
were under 45% of the income tax’s base in 1925 and under 60% in 1935.112
A major theme throughout the entire history of tax in the United States was much
present in all of its glory at the birth of the individual income tax: when America
taxes wealth at all, it takes small and largely symbolic steps. Professor Carolyn C.
Jones has written a wonderful legal historical account of the rise of the income tax
“from a class tax to a mass tax,” chronicling the changes that were made as the
income tax morphed from its small beginnings to its hegemonic status as America’s
major source of revenue during World War II.113 Illustrating our primary tale, the
advent of wage withholding fueled the transformation. In the meantime, we should
keep this original “class tax” model of the income tax in mind: a small tax in its total
revenue contribution to the fisc, one that falls only on economic elites, who can avoid
it with sophisticated (“elite”) planning, and one that the wealthy can and will pay
politicians to save having to pay themselves. That model already fits the death tax
story just told and closely tracks the corporate income tax’s fate. This model—
modest, complex, and avoidable taxes on wealth; massive, simple, and inescapable
taxes on wages—will lead the income tax to be split into two, a simple wage/income
tax for the masses and the ur-income tax for the few.

107. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=500000.00&year1=191301&year2=202001 [https://perma.cc/G8WL9AKM].
108. See JARED WALCZAK & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., FISCAL FACT NO. 572, STATE
AND LOCAL TAX RATES 2018, at 2 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180313143458
/Tax-Foundation-FF572.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGU8-K9CQ].
109. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., MILESTONE DOCUMENTS IN THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES 70 (1995).
110. See Historical Sources of Income and Tax Items, TAX POLICY CTR. (2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-sources-income-and-tax-items
[https://perma.cc/Y5AB-V6S4].
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1988).
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2. Growing Up: FDR and Wartime Expansion . . . Through Wage Withholding
The Great Depression and, even more, World War II changed things for tax and
for many other aspects of America’s social and political life. The income tax was at
the center of the great social transformation. As Professor Jones expertly illustrates,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) relied on a massive expansion of the income tax
to finance the War effort. The class tax of the wealthy was married to a wage tax for
the many.
We can see the wider shift easily enough by returning to the “Big Three” taxes:
Individual Income, Corporate Income, Payroll. As percentages of GDP, these shares
were, respectively, 0.9%, 1.2%, and 1.8% in 1940, at the dawn of World War II.114
This constituted 3.9% of GDP in the aggregate, and the payroll tax was by far the
largest contributor, providing over 46% of the total despite being a flat 2% rate on
payrolls at the time.115 By 1945, things looked very different. The Big Three shares
had now become, respectively, 8.1%, 7.1%, and 1.5% of GDP.116 The total burden
of the Big Three had increased to 16.7% of GDP—a more than fourfold increase.
But the payroll tax, the leading tax of 1940, had actually fallen to third in relative
terms, and had fallen by 0.3% of GDP in absolute terms; payroll taxes in 1945
accounted for less than 9% of revenues from the Big Three. The individual income
tax, meanwhile, went from 0.9% to 8.1% of GDP, a 900% increase.
How did this happen? A very large part of the answer comes from the
development of wage withholding, an idea promulgated in part by Milton Friedman,
who was then working for the U.S. Treasury Department.117 Wage withholding
greatly assisted the government’s tax collection efforts as the rates under the income
tax rose and as its coverage expanded to the masses.118 The government could count
on third-party employers reporting the wages paid to employees in order to qualify
for their own deductions for wages paid; social security numbers made it easy to link
individuals to their pay. All of this helped to change the tax’s base, too, moving it to
more of a wage tax and less of a wealth one. By 1945, for example, more than 75%
of the individual income tax’s reported “income” came from wages and salaries. 119
Wage withholding did more than help the U.S. government raise the needed
monies to keep the world safe for democracy. It also brought the income tax to the
masses and planted the seeds of a second, comprehensive (and largely hidden) tax:
the wage/income tax. As one commentator wrote:
The Treasury itself publicly acknowledges, in a fact sheet on the history
of the U.S. tax system posted at its website, that wartime withholding not
only “greatly eased the collection of the tax,” but “also greatly reduced

114. See supra Figure 4; see also Jones, supra note 113, at 694.
115. Payroll Tax Rates, TAX POLICY CTR. (2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/statistics/payroll-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/D2QK-CDB7].
116. See supra Figure 4.
117. Robert Higgs, Wartime Origins of Modern Income-Tax Withholding, FOUND. FOR
ECON. EDUC. (Nov. 1, 2007), https://fee.org/articles/wartime-origins-of-modern-income-taxwithholding/ [https://perma.cc/W2PT-AME9].
118. See Jones, supra note 113, at 729.
119. See Historical Sources of Income and Tax Items, supra note 110.
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the taxpayer’s awareness of the amount of tax being collected, i.e.[,] it
reduced the transparency of the tax, which made it easier to raise taxes
in the future.” Some evidence: in 2005 more than 130 million individual
income-tax forms were filed, yielding the federal government $1,108
billion in revenue, and of that amount, $787 billion, or 71 percent, came
from withholding.120
Wage withholding was a major innovation. It made it practical and efficient to
collect massive amounts of taxes from ordinary workers without much fuss or bother.
Thus, we see the first hints of the wage/income tax—a relatively hidden, painless,
routine way for average Americans to fund their government. To this day, income
reported from third-party employers is the easiest, least expensive, most compliant
form of income tax payments.121
The World War II transformations to the individual income tax unleashed a major
political, social, and economic force. The small “class” tax became a large tax on the
masses, mainly meaning a wage tax on the vast middle class. Wage withholding
made things pretty simple for most and planted the seeds for the developments to
follow.
B. The Grand Illusion: The Rigging Was Always in Place
The death of the American income tax as an income tax is but an episode in a
much longer-running series. Understood as a battle between wealth and wages, the
simple fact of the matter is that wealth tends to win—at least until the revolution, or
social collapse, comes knocking. Sic transit gloria mundi. Wealth certainly wins in
the income tax’s death story.
The wealthy, by definition, do not need to rely on wages. They always had escape
valves under the U.S. income tax. Although the original tax, as we have seen, was
intended to fall on wealth and wages, structural features inherent in the income tax
and others added soon after its inception made sure that this social commitment to
taxing wealth lacked any real teeth. The gods of capital, in subjecting themselves to
the pain of taxation, had made sure that they built in Achilles’ heels—several of
them—in the government’s new tool: protections against any attempt to ramp up the
tax, as in fact occurred during World War I, when marginal tax rates exploded to as
high as 70%.122
I have called the three simple steps by which the wealthy avoid income taxes, and
which are all based on unquestionably legal aspects of the tax law, Tax Planning 101:
“Buy/Borrow/Die.”123 We start with the “Buy” step, turning on the realization

120. Higgs, supra note 117, at 32 (alteration in original).
121. See Alan Cole, The Top Ten Sources of Personal Income, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 2, 2015),
https://taxfoundation.org/top-ten-sources-personal-income/ [https://perma.cc/3YHJ-8WAT];
Aaron Krupkin & Adam Looney, 9 Facts About Pass-Through Businesses BROOKINGS INST.
(May 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/9-facts-about-pass-through-businesses/
[https://perma.cc/8EWU-EBSC] (see item 9 and chart).
122. SOI Tax Stats - Historical Table 23, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statshistorical-table-23.
123. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM

1262

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1233

requirement of Macomber.124 The late law professor William D. Andrews famously
dubbed the realization requirement an “Achilles’ Heel” of the income tax.125 And so
it is. But I have come to see that it is only one of the income tax’s heels, going along
with the “Borrow” and “Die” steps. These three steps, reflecting simple tax-law
doctrines, make taxation voluntary for those with wealth. Because these three steps
exist, any actual attempt to tax wealth under the income tax—imposing capital-gains
tax on the sale of assets, for example—is handcuffed from the start. Importantly, too,
none of these tricks work—anymore—for wage earners.
1. Heel #1: The Realization Requirement (Buy)
Eisner v. Macomber, decided in 1920, importantly gave us the realization
requirement.126 This doctrine means that one does not pay tax on the gain, or the rise
in value, of an asset until and unless that gain is “realized” in some taxable
transaction, paradigmatically a sale.127 Critically, this means that simple “buy and
hold” investors need pay no current tax. Tax is only paid when an asset produces
cash.
It is thus no surprise that many assets never pay cash. If our friendly saver Ant,
for example, had purchased $1000 worth of Berkshire Hathaway stock in 1965, when
Warren Buffett took over the company, that investment would be worth more than
$24 million by the end of 2017.128 Only once in that fifty-two-year history—when
Buffett said “[he] must have been in the bathroom” after the company declared a
$0.10 per share dividend in 1967129—did Berkshire Hathaway ever declare and pay
a dividend, on which Ant would have had to pay some tax. Otherwise, Ant has some
$24 million in unrealized appreciation—what has been called the “800 pound
gorilla” of the tax system130—on which she only ever has to pay tax if she sells the
stock. And the simple advice of Step One, “Buy,” is never to sell (your winners, at

BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002) [hereinafter MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT]; EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: INCOME TAX LAW, at xix (2012)
[hereinafter MCCAFFERY, INCOME TAX LAW]; McCaffery, supra note 64.
124. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
125. William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278, 280 (Charles E. Walker & Mark
A. Bloomfield eds., 1984).
126. 252 U.S. at 207.
127. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2018).
128. John Maxfield, An Interesting Chart About Berkshire Hathaway, MOTLEY FOOL (July
23, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/07/23/an-interesting-chart-aboutberkshire-hathaway.aspx [https://perma.cc/5TK8-U87E] (last updated Apr. 30, 2018,
10:35 PM).
129. Morgan Housel, Buffett: You Want a Dividend? Go Make Your Own, MOTLEY FOOL
(Mar. 4, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.fool.com/investing
/general/2013/03/04/buffett-you-want-a-dividend-go-make-your-own.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8SWD-55AV].
130. See Jesse Drucker, Buffett-Ducking Billionaires Avoid Reporting Cash Gains to IRS,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-21/billion
aires-duck-buffett-17-tax-target-avoiding-reporting-cash-to-irs
[https://perma.cc/779V
-G9KR].
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least). It is this realization requirement, alone, that Professor Andrews called the
Achilles’ Heel of the income tax because it, alone, with enough planning, could kill
the income tax.
Unrealized income is simply not “income” that has to be reported on any tax form.
Thus, for example, when Warren Buffett revealed that he had just under $40 million
($40,000,000) in taxable income for the calendar year 2010,131 he did not reveal, and
his tax forms did not have to reveal, that he also had over $8 billion ($8,000,000,000)
in unrealized appreciation that year from his shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock
alone.132 This basic analytic fact, true for over a century, helps to provide one of the
optical illusions hiding the rather flat universal wage tax. While high-income
reporters pay high income taxes—such that most of the income tax is paid by those
with the highest incomes—the wealthy do not have to show high “incomes” in the
first place. They can play Buy/Borrow/Die with their wealth. Statistics of “income”
hide the privileges of wealth.133 This is why AOC’s raise-the-rates approach will not
affect the wealthy.
This might be just a curiosity, however, if the Court’s decision in Macomber and
the realization requirement were all that the wealthy had going for them. It would be
true that they could amass billions, tax-free, as Buffett and other billionaires clearly
have done in abundance. But what good would that do them? The realization
requirement simply defers the moment of tax to when the taxpayer cashes out, which
seems sensible enough. Surely America’s many billionaires would have to pay some
tax before they could spend their vast fortunes—for instance, before running for
elective office?
Well, no, they do not.
2. Heel #2: The Nontaxation of Debt (Borrow)
Simply buying and holding assets is a wonderful way to get wealthy, and it is
indeed tax-free under the realization requirement. But it can also be fun-free, because
one can only have so much fun reflecting on her net worth. Real people have to live.
If the wealthy had to sell assets to finance their lifestyles, the realization requirement
of Macomber would be “just” a matter of timing—the IRS could come in and tax the
gain on the sale.
But the wealthy do not have to sell their assets to live large, as President Trump,
among others, knows full well.134 They can simply move on to Step Two of Tax
Planning 101 and “Borrow.” Borrowing is not income, under any definition of
“income.” When you borrow, you have a precisely offsetting obligation to repay your

131. Janet Novack, Warren Buffett’s Effective Federal Income Tax Rate Was Just 11%,
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2011, 4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2011/10/12/war
ren-buffets-effective-federal-income-tax-rate-is-just-11/#7868ad93454d
[https://perma.cc
/HH84-MSBN].
132. McCaffery, supra note 10, at 312–13.
133. See Jenny Bourne, Eugene Steuerle, Brian Raub, Joseph Newcomb & Ellen Steele,
More Than They Realize: The Income of the Wealthy, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 335, 335–36 (2018).
134. See Edward McCaffery, Trump is the King of Debt but Not of Taxes, CNN (Sept. 2,
2016, 8:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/opinions/trump-king-of-debt-but-not
-taxes-opinion-mccaffery/index.html [https://perma.cc/PD3S-93PW].
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loan—you are, financially, no better off. This is true even when you borrow against
appreciated assets.135 Borrowing allows the wealthy to monetize their unrealized
appreciation without paying any tax. In case one thinks that is some arcane academic
matter, consider, if President Trump’s financial lifestyle is not sufficient to convince
you, the fact that Oracle CEO Larry Ellison has at least a $10 billion line of credit.136
He is free to draw on that, at any time and for any reason, tax-free. Then again, it
should not surprise us that the wealthy have already figured out how the tax system
works to favor them.
3. Heel #3: Stepped-up Basis on Death (Die)
All things must end, or so they say. As it happens, the tax-avoidance game of Buy
and Borrow can go on forever. The appreciated assets from Step One have what tax
professionals call a “built-in gain.” Ant, for example again, has a tax basis in her
Berkshire Hathaway stock of $1000 from when she bought it in 1965.137 That stock
is now worth $24,000,000. Ignoring the one year of dividends (Ant would have paid
tax on her dividend, and this would have increased her basis), Ant has $23,999,000
of built-in gain: the difference between the stock’s current value, $24,000,000, and
its cost or basis, $1000.138 If and when Ant sells her stock, she will have to pay tax
on that gain, almost certainly at capital-gains rates.
Except that Ant need never sell the stock. If she wants to have some pleasure
herself, she can borrow away, as just noted in Step Two. If Ant holds her stock until
her death and then passes it along to her children, those little ants will get the stock
income tax-free under I.R.C. § 102 and with a basis equal to fair market value, or
$24,000,000, under I.R.C. § 1014, the “Angel of Death” provision for stepped-up
basis on death.139 The little ants could sell the stock the day they get it, pay off their
mother’s debts, and start playing Tax Planning 101 themselves—all tax-free. Vice
President Biden and other Democratic 2020 presidential candidates have endorsed
plans to repeal I.R.C. § 1014,140 as did President Obama in his 2015 State of the
Union Address: if this were to pass, it would end a century of this particular tax perk
for the wealthy.141

135. See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952).
136. Julie Bort, Larry Ellison Has Secured $10 Billion Worth of Credit for His Personal
Spending, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/larry-ellison-has
-a-10b-credit-line-2014-9 [https://perma.cc/E4XA-U6TD].
137. See supra note 76.
138. See I.R.C. § 2502 (2018).
139. See Len Burman, President Obama Targets the ‘Angel of Death’ Capital Gains Tax
Loophole, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2015/01/18/preside
nt-obama-targets-the-angel-of-death-capital-gains-tax-loophole/ [https://perma.cc/Y26B
-MXSM].
140. Rocky Mengle, 2020 Election: Tax Plans for All 19 Democratic Presidential
Candidates, KIPLINGER (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/taxes/ T043
-S001-tax-plans-2020-democratic-presidential-candidates/index.html [https://perma.cc/5V
KM-92KE]; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
141. See State of the Union Surprise: President Targets Inherited Assets in Middle-Class
Tax Reform, MCGUIREWOODS (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client
-resources/Alerts/2015/1/State-Union-Surprise [https://perma.cc/44P9-43Z9].
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The careful reader will note that none of this means that Ant’s estate will pay an
estate tax, because that tax is a net wealth tax, on assets minus liabilities. If Ant dies
with $24 million in stock and $14 million in debt—she got to have some fun, after
all, using Step Two—there would be no estate tax under the current $11 million per
person exemption. Similarly, if Ant borrowed 100% against her assets, there would
be no inheritance—and no tax either. In sum, Ant will have made $24 million over a
fifty-two-year period from capital appreciation—over $460,000 per year for the
entire period—shared between herself and her heirs, altogether tax-free, forever.
4. Summing Up
It is all about wealth versus wages. It is good to be wealthy. The three steps of
Buy/Borrow/Die allow Steve Jobs to reduce his wages to $1 and Warren Buffett to
become one of the wealthiest persons in the world without even maxing out on his
social security contributions at his day job as CEO of Berkshire Hathaway. More
particularly—and what should not be surprising at this point—the three steps of
Buy/Borrow/Die lay the seeds for the conversion of the “income” tax into a wage
tax. If our friend Ant were able to save $1000 after paying tax on her wages in 1965,
and to have bought Berkshire Hathaway stock, she would now have stock worth $24
million, and she would never have paid tax again after 1965.
It is a simple fact that billionaires in America can live extraordinarily well and
completely tax-free off their wealth. It is an equally simple fact that people who live
off paid wages cannot do so.
C. Reality Bites
I have written a great deal about Buy/Borrow/Die and about its importance as an
analytic possibility: this is unquestionably simple, perfectly legal tax advice.142 The
possibility of the wealthy paying little or no taxes on their holdings is what constrains
important matters of tax-law design, such as the preferential capital-gains rate—since
the wealthy do not ever have to sell their assets in order to enjoy consumption, tax
rates on asset sales can never get too high. Empirical data to back these claims has
been hard to come by, in large part because the rich are too few and too secretive for
much government data to exist on them. But the facts are there, and they are
beginning to emerge.
A recent empirical study published in the prestigious National Tax Journal, for
example, shows that the wealthy have very low rates of “realizing” their capital gains,
and hence, they have low effective tax rates measured against their true economic
gains.143 The authors conclude:
[I]t seems clear that much capital income of top wealth holders either is
not subject to federal income taxation or is effectively excluded from
taxation by a preferential tax rate. Realized income from capital therefore
significantly understates the true economic return to capital. For most
wealthy individuals, capital income is a discretionary event due to the

142. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 123.
143. Bourne, Steuerle, Raub, Newcomb & Steele, supra note 133.
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large percentage of capital held in the form of assets like corporate stock
or real estate that need not be sold. Top wealth holders also tend to
concentrate their wealth in assets that yield the highest average long-term
returns, as well as seek opportunities to shelter assets via trusts, family
limited partnerships, and other means. Hence, their lower realized rates
of return do not reflect lower economic rates of return . . . .144
The study’s authors follow this paragraph by simply stating, “These results should
not be surprising.”145 They are certainly not surprising to those aware of the analytic
possibilities of Buy/Borrow/Die.
Figure 11 gives a historical perspective and graphical look at the basic ideas. It
shows both net capital gains and the actual taxes owed on them, as a percentage of
GDP from 1954 to 2013. Recall that, for most of this period, overall American taxes
were close to 20% of GDP, and the Big Three contributed around 16% in a typical
year. Recall also that labor’s share of the national income, as Figure 1 illustrated,
was in steady decline. And yet taxes from realized capital gains were typically far
below 1% of GDP for this period, only peaking when capital-gains rates were set to
go up in the mid-1980s under President Ronald Reagan and during the spectacular—
for the wealthy—internet boom of the 1990s. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, who prepared Figure 11, “[r]evenues from capital gains realizations ranged
from a low of 0.2% of GDP in 1957 (the year in which realizations measured as a
share of GDP were lowest) to a high of 1.24% of GDP in 2000 (when realizations
relative to the economy spiked).”146

144. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE & JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSET
HOLDINGS AND CAPITAL GAINS 2 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51831
[https://perma.cc/QJ6K-PGGY].
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Figure 11: Capital Gains Reported and Taxes Paid on Capital Gains, Percentage of
GDP, 1954–2013147
Net Capital Gains Reported on Individual Tax Returns and Taxes Owed on
Those Gains, 1954–2013

Table 1 gives a snapshot of the composition of sources for the income tax in the
year 2012:
Table 1: Top Ten Sources of Personal Income, 2012148
Top Ten Sources of Total Income on U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns,
2012
Income Type
Amounts (billions)
Salaries and Wages
$6301
Capital Gains Less Losses
$623
Taxable Pensions and Annuities
$612
Partnerships and S-Corporation Net Income
$535
Business Net Income
$304
Dividends
$260
Taxable IRA Distributions
$231
Taxable Social Security Benefits
$224
Taxable Interest
$112
Unemployment Compensation
$71
These “top ten” sources of individual income tax revenues accounted for over
80% of total income tax revenues.149 A brief glance show the importance of salaries

147. Id.
148. ALAN COLE, TAX FOUND., FISCAL FACT NO. 449, SOURCES OF PERSONAL INCOME 2
(2015), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF449.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YL2S-Y5TE]; SOI Tax Stats—Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete
Report), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publi
cation-1304-complete-report [https://perma.cc/TLH9-B2AZ] (last updated Mar. 10, 2020).
149. See Federal Tax Revenue by Source, 1934–2018, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013),
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and wages. These are over ten times the magnitude of the next largest item, capital
gains less losses. Simple wages, from Line 1, account for some 68.2% of the total
from these ten items; capital gains come in at under 7%. A closer look deepens the
perspective. Line 3 (taxable pensions and annuities), Line 7 (taxable IRA
distributions), Line 8 (taxable social security benefits), and Line 10 (unemployment
compensation) also come, overwhelmingly, from the labor side of the capital-labor
divide: these are payments to people on account of their working or for time spent in
the paid workforce. Adding these items in on the labor side of the ledger brings its
share of the whole to over 80%. And we would not be fully done with the analysis,
because much of Line 4 (partnership and S-corporation income) also comes from the
labor side in the form of small proprietorships and other “pass-through” entities,
which typically fail to break out their full wages.150
The first two items in Table 1 give us a quick look at the basic story and show
how far we have travelled since 1913. Recall that wages and salaries were not even
reported by the government for the first three years of the income tax and came in at
about 30% of the total in 1917.151 At the end of a century of income taxation in 2012,
taxes collected from “wealth and wages” were more than ten times as much as the
amount of taxes on “capital gains less losses,” and this fails to fully capture the
benefits to wealth, not wages, both because most “capital gains” went unrealized and
because the tax rate on realized capital gains is lower than that on wages.152 The
income taxes attributable to wages are thus more likely twenty times as much as the
taxes from capital gains. And the payroll tax, the other half of the universal wage tax,
does not even apply to capital gains—only to wages.
Summing up Act One, we have seen the income tax conceived and brought into
being as a modest tax on the wealthy, meant to tax both wealth and wages—but only
up to a limited point. When the government needed more revenues—a lot more
revenues—it engrafted a massive wage tax onto the preexisting modest wealth one.
The branch then took over and killed the original tree. The individual income tax that
emerged from World War II as America’s major tax was and always has been largely
a wage tax, a trend that has been accelerating even while wages in the real world
have been stagnating. The ur-income tax—the taxation of wealth, not wages—
meanwhile keeps losing teeth. And all this has occurred at a time when labor’s share
of the national income has been shrinking, as Figure 1 shows.
IV. ACT TWO: RONALD REAGAN AND THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Any story of the death of the income tax has to give pride of place to President
Ronald Reagan. After FDR had overseen the wartime, shotgun marriage of the ur-

https://taxfoundation.org/federal-tax-revenue-source-1934-2018/
[https://perma.cc/A8ZF
-2S3F].
150. See Aaron Krupkin & Adam Looney, 9 Facts About Pass-through Business,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/9-facts-about-passthrough-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/ZX9P-YN2G].
151. See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
152. Historical Capital Gains and Taxes, TAX POLICY CTR. (May 4, 2017),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-capital-gains-and-taxes [https://perma.cc
/5S3A-CBKE].
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income tax and an ascendant, basic, wage/income tax, Reagan, who had ridden into
power based in large part on his tax-cutting bona fides as the former governor of
California, advanced the cause. But he did not do so in the way most people think.
Reagan was not so much a tax-cutting president as a tax-reforming one, and his
principal reforms significantly advanced the universal wage-tax project—indeed,
Norquist claims that Reagan asked him to form his iconic political organization,
Americans for Tax Reform, in 1985.153 Reagan’s tax policies, particularly his
signature Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA 86”),154 importantly laid the groundwork
for a structural separation of wealth and wages within a nominally unified income
tax. Reagan raised the standard deduction, getting people off the income tax rolls
altogether,155 a move that President Trump would later repeat.156 More
fundamentally, TRA 86 put in place a series of rules aimed at preventing wage
earners from avoiding taxes by taking deductions attributable to capital that they did
not own but had borrowed: “tax shelters,” in a more colloquial parlance.157 At the
same time, Reagan’s policies reduced the corporate income tax158 and increased the
payroll tax.159
In sum, Act One featured a marriage of wealth and wage taxation. Act Two
features their separation.
A. Saving the Income Tax as a Wage Tax
Due in part to high inflation in the 1970s—the marginal rate brackets under the
individual income tax were not indexed for inflation until the passage of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA),160 and that provision of the law did
not become effective immediately161—the size of the individual income tax had
soared, as Figure 4 again demonstrates. The income tax’s burden reached 8.7% of
GDP in 1980, the year Reagan was elected, and 9.1%—then a post-War high—in
1981, his first year as President. There was clear and overwhelming support for
cutting the individual income tax, and Reagan did just that—first in ERTA, which
reduced the highest marginal tax rate under the income tax (which had been 70%
ever since President John F. Kennedy cut it from 90% in 1963) to 50%.162 Five years

153. About Americans For Tax Reform, AM. FOR TAX REFORM (Mar. 23, 2009),
https://www.atr.org/americans-tax-reform-a2878 [https://perma.cc/BQ7J-BEMS].
154. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA 86”), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
155. Id. § 102, 100 Stat. at 2099–102.
156. See infra Section V.A.
157. See TRA 86, tit. V, 100 Stat. at 2233–49.
158. Id. § 601, 100 Stat. at 2249.
159. See id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 2096–99.
160. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
161. See Stephen J. Entin, Tax Indexing Turns 30, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-indexing-turns-30/ [https://perma.cc/L2ND-RJ7Q].
162. See ERTA § 101, 95 Stat. at 176–86.
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later, TRA 86 brought the magical number to 28%163—a radical revolution in rates,
indeed.
Yet Reagan had a problem. Obviously, lower tax rates were wildly popular, and
Reagan’s iconic status was solidified by bringing the highly salient top marginal rate
under the income tax down by more than one-half, from 70% to 28%. By any stretch
of any imagination, that was a remarkable political feat. Yet the federal government
could not afford to see its principal source of revenue simply cut in half. It turns out
that it did not have to. By 1984 (three years after ERTA and, not coincidentally,
Reagan’s reelection year), the income tax had fallen to 7.5% of GDP, a 17.5% fall
from its 1981 level. But 1984 represented the low water mark for the individual
income tax under Reagan. It did not, that is, fall again after TRA 86, instead reaching
8.0% of GDP in 1989, Reagan’s first year out of office.
What had happened? In order to lower tax rates without significantly affecting
tax revenue, Reagan had to widen the income tax’s base: a smaller percentage of a
bigger base yielding roughly similar net revenues. How did he do this? Mainly by
shutting off the mechanisms under which wage earners could reduce their taxes by
using tricks developed on the wealth side, riffing off of Buy/Borrow/Die. TRA 86
reflected a systematic and thoughtful attack on tax shelters, or transactions meant to
hide wages from the IRS. The wealthy, on the other hand, did not need anything
fancier than Buy/Borrow/Die, which they always had. Blocking ordinary workers
from getting the goodies set the scene for isolating out wages, from which ultimately
there will be no deductions, from wealth. This is the state towards which Trump’s
TCJA takes us, Norquist dreamt of, and that the payroll tax has always been in.
Understanding all of this takes a pinch of tax theory. At the root of much of the
complexity of an income tax lies a fundamental distinction between business and
personal activities.164 Crudely, business is about making money and personal
activities are not. Basic tax theory—really just common sense—suggests that the
government should allow generous deductions on the business side but should not
allow them on the personal side. This is because when a taxpayer spends money with
the hope and reasonable anticipation of making money, the government, which will
tax the taxpayer’s profits, should stand aside: what is good for General Motors
(making money) is really good for a government that makes its money by taxing
private citizens on the money they make.165 But this is not true of personal expenses.
If the government let people deduct expenditures on food, clothing, shelter, and so
forth, there would be nothing left to tax.
These basic principles would leave things relatively simple or at least
understandable. There would be a general business-expense deduction, as there is
under I.R.C. § 162, and a general prohibition on personal-expense deductions, as

163. See TRA 86 § 101, 100 Stat. at 2096–2099.
164. See MCCAFFERY, INCOME TAX LAW, supra note 123.
165. To illustrate, suppose that Ant invests $1.00 and makes $1.50, for a $ 0.50 profit. The
tax rate is 30%. If the government allows a deduction for the $1.00 investment, Ant saves
$0.30 in taxes (30% of $1), so the after-tax initial outlay is reduced to $0.70. Then, when she
makes $1.50, the government takes $0.45 in taxes, and Ant keeps $1.05. Ant’s after-tax $0.70
therefore grows to $1.05, and the government’s $0.30 tax benefit, originally conferred to Ant,
becomes a $0.45 tax collected—both Ant and the government earning a 50% return.
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there is under I.R.C. § 262. A major problem arises, however, because of Tax
Planning 101.
As we have seen, wealth was never really fully subject to the income tax, even in
its purest “class tax” form from 1913.166 The three steps of Buy/Borrow/Die have
always existed so that the rich—by simply buying and holding assets, borrowing to
finance their lifestyles, and then dying—could avoid all tax.167 Workers were not so
lucky, of course, but they could still play Tax Planning 101 by initially borrowing
funds to play the game. The tax shelter industry relied on debt168 to generate the kinds
of business deductions (depreciation, interest, and the like) that the wealthy could
always use. Tax shelters, along with the ever-proliferating number of special
provisions in the Tax Code (such as helping pet political causes and so forth), made
the income tax that Reagan inherited a porous mess—a tax with nominally high rates
(up to 70%) but with so many deductions, exemptions, and exclusions that few paid
anything close to their nominal rate brackets based on “income” alone.
This is not the place to delve into detail on how, exactly, TRA 86 effected its
primary result—I have written more extensively about this elsewhere.169 A quick
summary will suffice. The problem illustrated by the analysis above is that
Buy/Borrow/Die provides a means of making money without showing any taxable
“income.” If we allowed deductions for the costs of earning such untaxed income,
taxpayers could show a tax loss: the expenses that they would report on a tax return
(interest, depreciation, and so forth) would exceed the income they were showing on
the same returns (in the limiting case, none). They could then use these tax, but not
economic, losses to “shelter” their wages and other income from taxation.
The strategy behind TRA 86 was not to approach this problem as a comprehensive
matter. TRA 86 left Buy/Borrow/Die and each of its planks altogether unaffected for
the wealthy. Instead, TRA 86 viewed the problem as occurring when wage earners
were allowed to take the same deductions always available to the wealthy, largely
because the wage earners were borrowing money. The leaks on the wage/income side
are what TRA 86 addressed to broaden the income tax’s base. TRA 86 limited
interest deductions under I.R.C. § 163, disallowing personal-interest deductions
except for home-mortgage interest (more on that, later, too).170 Most dramatically,
TRA 86 put in place a powerful “antishelter” provision, the passive activity loss rules
of I.R.C. § 469.171 This law made it impossible for taxpayers to deduct expenses
attributable to investments from wages. In effect, wages were walled off under
Reagan’s TRA 86; the various taxpayer attempts to “shelter” their wages from
income taxation were shut down.172

166. See supra Section III.A.
167. See supra Section III.B.
168. On debt as cause of tax shelter, see Calvin H. Johnson, Tax Shelter Gain: The
Mismatch of Debt and Supply Side Depreciation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1013 (1983).
169. McCaffery, supra note 64.
170. TRA 86, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 132, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113–14 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 163 (2018)).
171. Id. § 501, 100 Stat. at 2233–41 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 469 (2018)).
172. Attacks on tax shelters have continued through 2010, with the economic-substance
doctrine in I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2018).
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1. The Evolution of Two Income Taxes
As noted, none of the Reagan-era tax acts affected Buy/Borrow/Die for the
billionaire class. The realization requirement remained unchanged. The nontaxation
of borrowing remained unchanged. Stepped-up basis on death remained unchanged.
What changed, and dramatically, was the ability of wage earners to take advantage
of any of these things. A hard wall was created between the taxation of wealth and
wages. We can see the basic wage/income tax emerging, as planning opportunities
for wage earners to avoid taxes waned, more people took the standard deduction and
stopped itemizing, and wage earners had little to do but pay tax at their statutory rate.
Consider the base of the income tax for most Americans at this point, with an eye
towards Norquist’s dream.173 This base consists, overwhelmingly, of wages. We then
add to that whatever investment returns the taxpayer has, and we subtract whatever
deductions are allowed. But in the first part, the inclusions, we continue to allow taxfree provisions for savings in IRAs and pension plans, and the tax rate on investment
gains remains lower than on wages. On the second part, the deductions, TRA 86
systematically eliminated or severely limited the value of deductions attributable to
business or investment income for ordinary wage earners. This then leaves the
“personal” deductions: state and local sales taxes, mortgage interest, charitable
contributions, and the like. These personal deductions then had a target on them—
ripe for a death by a thousand cuts. Thus we shall see a continued attempt to limit or
eliminate personal deductions through the TCJA.
When we have taken these steps, we are at the promised land for the vast majority
of American taxpayers who are wage earners. They simply add up their wages. There
will be nothing to add, both because most Americans do not save much and because
ordinary savings will be sheltered in something like universal savings accounts. 174
There will be nothing left to subtract, because there will be no business or investment
deductions for workers to take, and because all the personal deductions will have
been eliminated or left for a dwindling number of itemizers. For everyone else,
America’s laborers, a postcard will do. Stay tuned.
B. Spin-offs and Sequels
On our way to President Trump and the TCJA, consider a few more milestone
moments in the income tax’s death march, many illustrating the breadth of
unintended consequences in tax.
1. Clinton, Roth, Gramm-Rudman, and Wage Taxation
President Bill Clinton did not do all that much in regard to income taxes, except
for raising the top marginal rate (largely on wages) to 39.6%175 and cutting the

173. See supra Section I.B.
174. See Robert Bellafiore, The Case for Universal Savings Accounts, TAX FOUND.
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/case-for-universal-savings-accounts/ [https://perma
.cc/WA4W-P6NU] (calling for universal savings accounts in Tax Cuts 2.0).
175. See John H. Cushman Jr., The Clinton Tax Bill; Something for (or From) Everybody,
N.Y. TIMES ARCHIVES (May 14, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/14/us/the-clinton-
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capital-gains rate (exclusively on wealth),176 which TRA 86 had temporarily raised,
to 20%. In so doing, Clinton was advancing the cause of converting the income tax
into a universal wage tax. But we pause on the Clinton years for a different reason:
the creation of Roth-style IRA accounts in 1997.177
Named after William Roth, a Republican Senator from Delaware, “Roth IRAs”
work on the prepaid consumption tax model, meaning that they generate no tax
deduction upfront but are never responsible for taxation again. This is unlike
“traditional” IRAs, which follow the postpaid model: one gets a deduction upfront,
hence pays no tax in the year of contribution, but is taxable on withdrawals (which
can even be mandatory under complex tax rules).178 As we learned above, prepaid
consumption-tax treatment is wage-tax treatment, as we see under the payroll tax.
Moving to Roth savings models—pursuing “Rothification” to the hilt—means
moving the “income” tax to a wage tax.
Why did Clinton and the Congress sign off on this move? Rather than thinking
about anything structural or long-term, a major part of the reason almost certainly
derived from legislative-budgeting rules, such as Gramm-Rudman.179 This law
forced the government to balance, or appear to balance, its budgets over a ten-year
window. In theory, prepaid and postpaid consumption-tax treatment (Roth and
traditional IRAs) should lead to the same place for both taxpayers and the
government. But there is a timing difference. Under traditional IRAs taxpayers get a
tax break now, and the government gets its money later. Under Roth IRAs, the
government gets its money now, and forswears any tax later. A government that cares
about the timing of its receipts—as our government now does, due in part to GrammRudman and progeny—will prefer Roth treatment.
And so we do. In 2000, taxpayers held $77.6 billion in Roth IRAs; by 2016, the
figure had ballooned to $660 billion.180 Nor is the treatment limited to IRAs—the
popular Section 529 educational plans and medical savings accounts work along the

tax-bill-something-for-or-from-everybody.html [https://perma.cc/PQ45-LJHW].
176. Charles Kadlec, The Dangerous Myth About Bill Clinton Tax Increase, FORBES (July
16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charleskadlec/2012/07/16/the-dangerous-myth-ab
out-the-bill-clinton-tax-increase/#205e431b6e8a [https://perma.cc/WLV7-JQ5N].
177. See generally Troy Segal, Roth IRA, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/r/rothira.asp [https://perma.cc/8SHD-7TJC] (last updated Jan. 17, 2020).
178. See Retirement Plan and IRA Required Minimum Distributions FAQs, IRS
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/retirement-plans-faqs-regarding-required-minimum
-distributions [https://perma.cc/8LKH-TNPP] (last updated June 18, 2019).
179. See 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, U.C. BERKELEY
BANCROFT LIBR. REGIONAL ORAL HIST. OFF., http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/projects
/debt/1985grammrudmanhollings.html [https://perma.cc/F5W7-RB86] (last updated Mar.
7, 2011).
180. CRAIG COPELAND, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., NO. 456, EBRI IRA DATABASE:
IRA BALANCES, CONTRIBUTIONS, ROLLOVERS, WITHDRAWS, AND ASSET ALLOCATION, 2016
UPDATE 1 (2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_456_iras
-13aug18.pdf?sfvrsn=6a58352f_2 [https://perma.cc/2WGL-NS8K]; Roth Assets in Individual
Retirement Accounts in the United States from 2000 to 2013, STATISTA RESEARCH DEP’T (Dec.
31, 2014), https://www.statista.com/statistics/187954/total-assets-of-roth-iras-in-the-us-since
-2000/ [https://perma.cc/G86D-459Z].
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Roth wage-tax model as well.181 “Rothification” is proceeding apace.182 This all
continues to move the overall income tax towards a wage tax—that is, towards its
death.
Note that Norquist seems to have not fully appreciated the Roth innovation, as his
steps include both repealing the capital-gains tax and giving unlimited deductions for
savings. But if we adopt universal savings accounts along a Roth model—as is
currently being proposed183 —there would be no need to repeal the capital-gains rate,
and no need to have deductions or subtractions for savings. All savings and
investment could take place within Roth-style accounts. No investment gains would
ever be taxed. Such a plan, as its advocates tout, would indeed be far simpler than
the traditional, postpaid IRAs, with their rules for mandatory withdrawals and so
forth. Universal Roth-style savings accounts are simple, for the same reason the
payroll tax’s taxation of savings and investment is simple—because an income tax
with universal Roth-style savings accounts is a payroll tax. People are taxed when
they earn wages and never again. That is simple, but not necessarily fair.
2. Bush Tax Cuts
Clinton’s capital-gains tax-rate cut combined with the internet boom led to a surge
in income tax revenues, helping to create a $1.2 trillion budgetary surplus that
Clinton himself was unable, politically, to spend. George W. Bush, elected along
with a Republican Congress, had no such difficulties. When Bush took office, the
income tax was again at a high, as a percentage of GDP, hitting 9.9% —an all-time
record —in 2000.184 President Bush slashed the income tax, first in the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) 185 and again in the
Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), 186 leading to a massive
change in the individual income tax’s overall burden, as Figure 4 clearly shows. After
Bush’s two terms—and the onset of the Great Recession—things had changed
dramatically.
In 2009, the individual income tax’s burden had fallen to 6.3% of GDP, an
astonishing nearly 40% drop over the decade.187 The corporate income tax,
meanwhile, fell in half, from 2% in 2000 to 1% in 2009. The payroll tax? It should
come as no surprise that there was little change here, a fall from 6.4% in 2000 to

181. I.R.C. § 529 (2018).
182. See generally Amir El-Sibaie, What Rothification Means for Tax Reform, TAX FOUND.
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/what-rothification-means-for-tax-reform/
[https://perma.cc/EA5Y-K6SF].
183. Universal Savings Account Act, H.R. 937, 115th Cong. (2017); Sarah O’Brien, New
GOP Plan Pushes Savings Accounts That Come with Tax Break, CNBC (Jul. 25, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/new-gop-plan-pushes-savings-accounts-that-come-with
-tax-break.html [https://perma.cc/NBR3-ACBR].
184. See supra Figure 4.
185. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
186. Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
187. See supra Figure 4.
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6.2% in 2009—a decline due to macroeconomic conditions under the recession, as
there were no legislative changes to the payroll tax to consider. No surprise there.
The payroll tax had commenced in 1935;188 seventy-five years later, in 2010, it was
still the only major American tax that had never been cut.
But in politics, as in economics and life, there is no free lunch. Bush’s massive
tax cuts had a price. Barack Obama was to come into office facing a serious economic
downturn, the Great Recession, and a looming budgetary crisis—brought on in large
part by the massive individual income tax cuts.
3. Obama’s Fiscal Cliff Fix
By 2009, Obama’s first year as President, the Big Three taxes were contributing,
respectively, to 6.3%, 1.0%, and 6.2% of the GDP. The total of 13.5% was low due
to both the tax cuts of Bush and the severe economic downturn, depressing the wages
that form the base of both the payroll and wage/income taxes. The figures also
revealed that the conservative post-War assault on the income tax was working: the
payroll tax, which had not been the major American tax since 1940, and which had
raised 18.5% as much as the individual income tax did in 1945, contributed over 98%
as much as the individual income tax did in 2009, 6.1% of GDP compared to 6.2%.
That in and of itself is a stunning story.
Faced with a Great Recession and tough economic times, Obama decided to cut
taxes. But for the first time in history, it was the payroll tax that he cut. Obama
enacted a “payroll tax holiday” of 2% in absolute terms, cutting the employee share
of social security from 6.45% to 4.45%.189 Payroll-tax revenues dipped, falling to
5.3% of GDP in 2011 and 2012, while individual income tax revenues recovered to
7.1% of GDP in each year.
The holiday did not last long. By the end of 2012, the Bush tax cuts, from both
EGTRRA (which had been extended) and JGTRRA, were set to expire.190 To resolve
the “fiscal cliff crisis,” Congress needed money. President Obama asked for $1.6
trillion in additional revenues over the following decade.191 There was much wailing
and gnashing of teeth as politicians and pundits debated fixes such as higher marginal
tax rates on the upper income.192 In the end, Obama got his $1.6 trillion, but only

188. See Laurence M. Vance, The Curse of the Withholding Tax, MISES INST. (Apr. 21,
2005), https://mises.org/library/curse-withholding-tax [https://perma.cc/8DYU-WKW3].
189. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309–10 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1401
note (2018)). Had Obama cut only the individual income tax, its burdens would have fallen
below the payroll tax’s, giving the latter tax the gold medal it had last held in 1940 as
America’s largest single tax. See supra Figure 4.
190. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act §§
101–102, 124 Stat. at 3298–99 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 note (2018)).
191. Janet Hook & Carol E. Lee, Obama Sets Steep Tax Target, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14,
2012, 10:43 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873235510045781171528
61144968 [https://perma.cc/SLJ4-MLW6].
192. See, e.g., id.
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$600 billion of it came from individual income tax reforms.193 The rest, $1 trillion—
62.5% of the whole increase—came from the expiration of the payroll tax holiday.
Like the individual income-tax cuts, the payroll-tax cut was set to expire. But unlike
the individual income tax’s cuts, the payroll-tax cuts were allowed to expire.194 In
the process, the death tax was further gutted.195 As with his Democratic predecessor
Bill Clinton, Obama’s tax policies ended up being swept into the wave towards wage,
and away from wealth, taxation.
C. The Big Three Taxes Under Reagan
Summing up Act II, consider the Big Three taxes in 1980, as Reagan was getting
elected, and again in 1990, a decade later: a total of 16.6% of GDP in 1980 (8.7%,
2.3%, 5.6%) and a total of 15.9% in 1990 (7.9%, 1.6%, 6.4%). The individual income
tax fell by 0.8% and the corporate income tax by 0.7% of GDP; the payroll tax, which
Reagan increased, rose by 0.8%. In sum, the total fall in the individual income tax
was offset nearly exactly by a rise in payroll taxes, with a pure fall in the corporate
income tax added and a continuing evisceration of the death tax to boot.
Within the generally opaque walls of the individual income tax itself, a structural
change was becoming more manifest. Wages were being isolated. The typical wage
earner was stripped of her access to tax shelters and left with a largely inescapable
wage tax, with few if any subtractions. The table was set for a continued attack on
the deductions that were left, as America continues to approach a postcard return for
the masses—paying taxes on their wages and on their wages alone.
V. ACT THREE: DONALD TRUMP AND THE TAX CUT AND JOBS ACT OF 2017
We continue the tale of the transformation of the income tax’s base from wealth
and wages, a true income tax, to wages alone, not an income tax. In Act I, we saw
the income tax born primarily as a tax on wealth and the wealthy. It grew up and
married onto a wage tax during World War II. Thereafter, even as wealth continued
to boom (as shown in Figure 2), it increasingly escaped its tax-paying role. Act II
saw a structural, analytic separation of wages from all other sources of income under
a nominally comprehensive income tax. That laid the groundwork for Act III, where
wealth and wage taxation will more fully divorce, so that any remaining wealth tax—
the ur-income tax—can die in peace, via a thousand cuts, while the wage/income tax
pays the bills.
A. A Third Act Twist
As the newly elected President Trump prepared to address tax reform, there was
no doubt that cuts were coming. Trump was a Republican, after all, elected with a

193. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §§ 101–102, 126
Stat. 2313, 2315–19 (2013) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1, 55, 68, 121, 2001 (2018)).
194. See Joseph Bishop-Henchman, Why Your 2013 Paychecks Are 2 Percent Less, TAX
FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/why-your-2013-paychecks-are-2-percent
-less/ [https://perma.cc/L9JL-L7X5].
195. See McCaffery, supra note 20, at 1236–37.
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Republican Congress behind him. Like Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W.
Bush before him, Trump was going to cut taxes. In fact, Trump so much wanted tax
cuts that he asked for the ultimate bill to be called the “Cut Cut Cut Tax Act.”196
There were only two questions.
The first question was by how much? The answer came quickly: $1.5 trillion over
a decade, even though few thought that the country could afford that much deficit
financing during good economic times (most mainstream economists consider it
prudent for the government to borrow or add to its deficit during harsh economic
times but then to pay down that deficit during good ones.)197 Congress passed
legislation, using a simple majority in the Senate, allowing for Trump’s ultimate tax
cuts to “cost” $1.5 trillion over a ten-year period, meaning that the cuts would be
debt financed. Once enacted, there was little doubt that the President and Congress
would spend every last cent of their newfound allowance.
The next question was, for whom would the tax cuts toll? And here came a
surprise that should not surprise you readers: the bulk of the tax revenue lost, some
$1 trillion in the initial House version of the TCJA, went to a corporate income tax
cut. The initial bill would have slashed the top corporate rate from 35% to 20%; after
much wailing and gnashing of teeth, the final number came in, reluctantly, at 21%.198
Unlike the far more modest cuts to the individual income tax in the TCJA, these
corporate tax cuts are “permanent.”199
To be fair, a broad consensus of economists supported corporate income tax
reform, as the nominal rates under the U.S. corporate tax had grown out of step with
worldwide norms and with U.S. multinationals’ “effective” (or “actual”) tax rates.200
This latter was because, just like the individual income tax that Reagan confronted
in the 1980s, the corporate income tax is riddled with loopholes, many involving
international tax planning, which erode its base.201 But most of the mainstream
economists supporting lower rates expected the same tactic used generally in the
TRA 86: that is, corporate income tax rates could come down as the base was built

196. See Thea Glassman, Tweets About Trump’s Cut Cut Cut Tax Act Are Just Savage,
ELITE DAILY (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.com/p/tweets-about-trumps-cut-cut-cuttax-act-are-just-savage-3205103 [https://perma.cc/MB9W-VJQ3].
197. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, America’s Disastrous New Normal: A Booming Economy and
Soaring Deficits, FORTUNE (Jan. 5, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/01/05/us-economy-deficitgovernment/ [https://perma.cc/4K78-45AC].
198. Kyle Pomerleau, The United States’ Corporate Income Tax Is Now More in Line with
Those Levied by Other Major Nations, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org
/us-corporate-income-tax-more-competitive/ [https://perma.cc/ZN62-7FK3].
199. TAX POLICY CTR., BRIEFING BOOK (2016) (ebook), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/sites/default/files/briefing-book/bb_full_2018_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG4V-V7AZ] (“The
Tax Cut and Jobs Act made significant changes to the corporate income tax and taxes on passthrough businesses. Unlike almost all personal tax provisions, which expire after 2025, most
corporate tax provisions are permanent.”).
200. Walter Frick, A Brief Guide to U.S. Corporate Tax Reform, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/a-brief-guide-to-u-s-corporate-tax-reform [https://per
ma.cc/8WS7-EFB5].
201. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS, AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), https://home.treasury.gov
/system/files/131/Report-Corporate-Tax-Shelters-1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GXB-Y9F6].
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up and reinforced.202 That did not turn out to be the TCJA approach. Instead, we got
a pure, net cut to the corporate income tax, scored in the House version as costing $1
trillion over a ten-year period. This represented two-thirds of the allocated pot of
gold for tax cuts. In the House version, the remaining $500 million was split, with
$300 million—in total, in the aggregate—going to the individual income tax, and the
remaining 20% going to further cuts to the death tax.203 In sum, fully 80% of the
TCJA’s tax cuts were allocated to wealth taxes—the corporate income and gift and
estate tax cuts—at a time when wealth was gaining and wages were losing in the real
world. This is a near perfect inversion of Obama’s payroll tax cut, which, of course,
only went to wages in the first instance—and which has long since expired.
This might seem like a third-act twist in our ongoing discussion of the individual
income tax’s death and resurrection as a universal wage tax. But it reminds us that
our story, the tax story, is really one big story: how the wealthy escape taxes that
wage earners cannot. Viewed in this light, the priority of corporate income tax cuts
in the TCJA is not surprising. These cuts fit perfectly into the wider story going back
to 1950: the transformation of the U.S. tax system from one falling on wealth and
wages to one falling mainly on wages. The corporate income tax began trending
upward under Obama, approaching the 2% of GDP level that has become its Maginot
Line (much as 8% seems to be the individual income tax’s political danger level), as
demonstrated by Figure 4. But the corporate income tax is a nonwage tax. Its steady
fall is part of the script, not a sideshow. The TCJA got us back on script.
The TCJA’s massive corporate income tax cut is also the answer to a puzzling
question: How can tax cuts help billionaires who do not pay much, if any, income
tax?
The wealthy in America, like Warren Buffett and Donald Trump, had long been
paying little or no taxes, as an effective matter, largely because they did not have to
show any “unrealized income” (or the proceeds of their debt) on their tax returns in
the first place by playing Buy/Borrow/Die. How could these billionaire nontaxpayers
get in on the tax-cutting party? Easy. It turns out that a primary effect of the TCJA’s
corporate income tax cut was a rise in stock market prices, because corporate costs—
in this case, taxes—had been cut. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, to pick just one
example, made $29 billion on account of the TCJA; we do not have to worry about
fact-checking the math because that figure came from Buffett himself.204 As the
owner of over one-third of Berkshire’s shares, the Trump tax cuts led to a $10 billion

202. See, e.g., Chris Atkins, Tax Reform and Revenue Neutrality: President’s Panel Should
Avoid the Redistribution of 1986, TAX FOUND. (July 13, 2005), https://taxfoundation.org/taxreform-and-revenue-neutrality-presidents-panel-should-avoid-redistribution-1986/
[https://perma.cc/Y584-QYPT].
203. The People’s Tax Page addressed this “tax cut pie” in videos, see People’s Tax Page,
Tax Cut Pie: People’s Tax Page Ep. 5, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=HrOPLbkn47M [https://perma.cc/8HD9-HELH]; People’s Tax Page, Tax Cut Pie:
Sabrina Live! (Special Holiday Episode), YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=a6ZcSwyEusw [https://perma.cc/W5ZY-69HT].
204. Emily Stewart, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Made $29 Billion Off the
Republican Tax Cuts, VOX (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics
/2018/2/24/17048378/warren-buffett-berkshire-hathaway-tax-cuts
[https://perma.cc/P8N6
-TBMD].
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benefit for a man who pays about $7 million in taxes every year. This means that
Buffett benefitted enough, personally, from the corporate income tax cuts of the
TCJA to allow him to pay all of his individual income taxes for well over a century—
not that he would ever have to pay taxes on the $10 billion windfall from the TCJA.205
B. Back to the Tale of Two “Income” Taxes
1. The Wage/Income Tax Slouches Towards a Postcard
The TCJA did not allocate much of the tax-cut pie to individual income taxpayers:
just some 20% of the whole, $300 billion over a ten-year period, to be divided among
some 120 million tax-paying households. What did the TCJA do with this relatively
meager amount of tax cuts on the individual income tax side? There were some
modest rate reductions set to expire after the 2024 elections.206 But by far the biggest
theme of the TCJA on the individual side was to simplify the tax by moving it closer
to a wage tax. The Reagan years left the script, annotated by Norquist: continue to
chip away both at any additions to wages, in the form of the taxation of wealth, and
at any subtractions from wages, in the form of lingering personal deductions. TCJA
followed the script to a T.
The TCJA doubled the standard deduction for all taxpayers, individuals and
married.207 This got many taxpayers off the tax rolls altogether and moved even more
people to choose the simple standard deduction in lieu of filling out additional forms
and taking itemized deductions: after the TCJA, only 10% of individual income tax
filers are expected to itemize.208 Personal exemptions were eliminated,209 largely
offsetting the increased standard deduction (and hurting larger families). Personal
deductions were limited, furthering the push towards the simpler standard-deduction
returns, which will make up 90% of all. After much politicking and discussion over
even more radical changers, the TCJA settled on limiting annual state and local tax
deductions to $10,000 per household maximum,210 and on further cutting back the
personal mortgage interest deductions by limiting the principal amount of the
mortgage to $750,000.211 There were many more changes along these lines, such as
getting rid of smaller deductions and further weakening the alternative minimum tax
(long one of Norquist’s pet peeves, and his step 5).
The TCJA did not get us to a “postcard” tax return, and we may never quite get
there, in part for reasons discussed briefly below. But it got us close, even as scholars

205. Buffett has pledged to give his Berkshire Hathaway shares away to the Gates
Foundation on his death. Thus, he faces no estate tax. He can borrow away and spend against
his $10 billion windfall as much as he likes to avoid income taxes.
206. See Amir El-Sibaie, A Look Ahead at Expiring Tax Provisions, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 18,
2018), https://taxfoundation.org/look-ahead-expiring-tax-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/7PZ2
-CL98].
207. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021(a), 131 Stat.
2054, 2072–73 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 63 (2018)).
208. See supra text accompanying note 14.
209. I.R.C. § 151(d)(5) (2018).
210. I.R.C. § 164 (2018).
211. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2018).
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have been exploring other means of getting most Americans out of the need to fill
out most tax forms, such as Michael Graetz (through comprehensive tax reform and
a value-added tax (VAT) for the masses)212 and Joseph Bankman (through
government-prepared forms).213 But hope springs eternal, and House Republicans
were clearly hoping for a postcard size return for the many to emerge out of the
TCJA. They even produced a version, which I have set forth as Figure 12.
Figure 12: Proposed “Postcard” Return, House Republicans, 2017214

Although the final TCJA did not fully reflect this postcard return—in large part
because of the difficulties in the battles over personal deductions—and thus, no one
can use it (yet), we can learn much by considering it. It shows us the future—the
direction toward which this all is heading. As we proceed line by line, keep in mind
the end: a tax that falls on wages with no additions or subtractions. We are almost
there.
Line 1 of Figure 12 is “wage and compensation income.” This will be reflected
on W-2s for the overwhelming majority of American workers. All that is left is to
add and subtract from these wages.
There is one line of addition, Line 2, for “½ of investment income.” The one-half
reflects the favorable capital-gains rate break for income from wealth or savings.
(Note, by the way, that not only are these items of income taxed at favorable rates
under the income tax; they are also not taxed at all under the payroll tax.) This line,

212. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLER, FAIR, AND
COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008).
213. See Joseph Bankman & Dennis Ventry, The Case for Easy, Free Tax Filing, FORBES
(Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2013/04/09/the-case-for-easy-free
-tax-filing/#5628feac2bd2 [https://perma.cc/5UQ4-5AVA].
214. TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA
18 (2016), http://templatelab.com/a-better-way-tax-policy-paper/ [https://perma.cc/4QYT
-MLF2].
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however, is on deathwatch. Most Americans do not have much investment income
to begin with—the wealthy can hide their investment income as “unrealized
appreciation;” and the entire line will go away completely if and when Norquist’s
dream obtains, and we either reduce the tax rate on all investment income to zero or
allow universal Roth-style savings accounts, as is being proposed.
This brings us to Line 3 and to the start of “subtractions” from wages: “subtract
contributions to specified savings plans.” This is another nod towards savings and
wealth. But this line, as Norquist himself generally seems to assume, countenances
savings plans along the traditional IRA or postpaid model—deduction now, inclusion
later. If and when we move fully to Roth-style treatment—if and when the income
tax gets fully “Rothified”—both Lines 2 and 3 would become irrelevant. There
would be no investment gains to tax. Ever.
Still tracking the postcard, we arrive at a fork in the road. The taxpayer either
subtracts the standard deduction (Line 4) or her “itemized” ones. In this House
version of the postcard, which proved to be only aspirational for now, the potential
itemized deductions have been reduced to two: mortgage interest (Line 5) and
charitable contributions (Line 6). If those two deductions die—and both have been
proposed to be repealed215—and universal Roth-style savings accounts come about,
then our postcard would go straight from wages and compensation (Line 1), minus a
standard deduction (Line 4), to taxable income (Line 7).
Once the tax is calculated, by computer or simple table, from taxable income, all
that is left is to subtract the tax “credits” and then see what is owed. This postcard
retains three credits, the “child credit” (Line 9), the “earned income credit,” which is
the principal form of workfare, or aid to the working poor, in America (Line 10) and
the “higher education credit” (Line 11). Eliminate these three credits—as plenty of
conservatives would love to do216—and our “postcard” return would look as follows:
(Wages - Standard Deduction) x Tax Rate
That is a very simple tax. It has the same base as the payroll tax, except for the
“standard deduction,” a matter easily handled by computers and software. And this
“standard deduction” simply creates a zero bracket under the individual income tax
that is taken away by the payroll tax, as we shall see clearly enough when we get to
the full-on universal wage tax. We are almost there.
Will we ever literally see a postcard return or go formless altogether? To the major
social, political, and economic themes of this Article, it does not much matter: I am
attempting to center the political analysis of tax policy on reality, substance not
forms. Politicians may well choose to keep a short form to continue an appearance,
fostered by FDR during the massive tax expansion of World War II, that we are all
in this together. Or politicians might want their credits salient (such as $400 for

215. See Ed Dolan, Is the Charitable Deduction Worth Keeping?, NISKANEN CTR. (Apr.
17, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/charitable-deduction/ [https://perma.cc/5KVV
-R2H3].
216. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, The Credit We Love to Hate: The Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), FORBES (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012
/02/01/the-credit-we-love-to-hate-the-earned-income-tax-credit-eitc/#2cece4bf35f6
[https://perma.cc/CV4V-ZVNL].
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“making work pay”217 or $1000 for a child or two218) to make voters like them. But
reality will continue to bite. And this reality, for all Americans, is that wages are
taxed heavily with virtually no options to escape or reduce the taxes, and wealth is
not.
2. The Ur-Income Tax: Lingering Complexity, for Reasons
Not everyone will have it so lucky, if luck is the right term, in being able to fill
out a postcard return or not even bothering with a return at all. Under the TCJA, some
ten percent of individual income taxpayers, five percent of Americans, will still be
itemizers. Much of this is a matter of time, as the assault on personal deductions
continues in its step-by-step, death by a thousand cuts fashion. We can easily predict,
at this point, continued attacks on mortgage interest, charitable contribution, and state
and local tax deductions. But even if Congress eliminated all itemized deductions,
some taxpayers would still face complexities requiring longer forms and more
complex taxes.
Conceptually, the reason that these taxpayers need more forms is that they have
wealth as well as wages, or at least (in the case of the “carried interest” crowd) they
are attempting to make their wages look like wealth.219 The postcard return will apply
to those whose only source of taxable income is wages and (once Norquist and
Congressional Republicans get their way and we have universal, Roth-style, savings
accounts) even to those with wages and some investment returns. These taxpayers
will only have to pay what I have been calling the wage/income tax. What I am
calling the ur-income tax is what will face the minority—a minority we can expect
to be shrinking over time as exemptions for returns to wealth rise, just as the range
of the death tax has been constricted to the top 0.2% of Americans by wealth levels.
For this minority, with some aspects of wealth in the picture, complexity endures. As
with the death tax or corporate income tax, politicians might want this state of affairs:
an income tax on death watch, applying to few, raising little, but preserving both the
appearance of taxing wealth and the opportunity to extract sums from the wealthy
attempting to avoid what taxes remain on them.
The taxpayers who will not be able to fill out the postcard return, or go formless
altogether, fall into two categories, which often overlap. In one category, there are
those whose wages can look like wealth or be mixed up with wealth (the “labor and
capital combined” category in Eisner v. Macomber).220 These include the many selfowned businesses, small proprietorships, and other forms of entrepreneurs. In the
second group are those with wealth, not (or not just) wages—that is, those wealthy
who show some income that is still subject to whatever remains of the ur-income tax.

217. The Making Work Pay Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-making
-work-pay-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/QF5P-V7GK] (last updated June 21, 2019).
218. Gil Charney, The New Child Tax Credit, H&R BLOCK (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.hr
block.com/tax-center/irs/tax-reform/new-child-tax-credit/ [https://perma.cc /4RQ5-PLFP].
219. See TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 199 (stating that carried interest, or “income flowing
to the general partner of a private investment fund, often is treated as capital gains for the
purposes of taxation,” but noting that many commentators view this as an unfair advantage
because the income resembles ordinary wages).
220. 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also text accompanying supra notes 60, 79–81.
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Until and unless all capital gains are repealed, these taxpayers will still have to track
their income-tax bases, report gains or losses from sale, and/or plan on some
“nonrecognition” transaction (such as the like-kind exchange provision of I.R.C. §
1031).221 Of course, this latter category of taxpayers—the billionaires and dynasty
trust-fund babies living off wealth alone—still have the old standby,
“Buy/Borrow/Die,” to keep things from getting too serious. There may still be
planners and politicians to pay, but tax burdens should remain light. After all, nothing
has changed under FDR, Reagan, Clinton, Obama, Trump, or anyone else to take
away Buy/Borrow/Die.
The TCJA weighed in in the first category, mixed wealth and wages. Enter the
“qualified business income” (QBI) provision, perhaps the most complex feature of
the TCJA, codified as the new I.R.C. § 199A.222 QBI has parallels to TRA 86’s
“passive activity loss rules”—a complex set of provisions meant to get at a structural
issue in tax reform. In 1986, the concern had been with isolating wages from the
benefits of wealth—making sure that there were not any deductions to subtract from
(or “shelter”) the wage tax base. The concern in 2017 was to protect wealth, or
capital, from getting swept into higher-wage tax rates. A small taste of theory helps
set the stage.
Much of American business occurs through major corporations, called C
corporations because they are taxed under the corporate income tax, located in
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code. As noted above, this tax is a nonwage
tax because it falls on corporate income after deducting corporate wages paid.223
Once this net corporate income is taxed, shareholders, as owners of the corporation,
face a problem—how to get cash out of the corporation and into their personal
pockets. Corporations will often dividend out some or all of the corporate profits.
But then the shareholder must pay a second tax on the dividends received. (This is
why Berkshire Hathaway and many other companies, such as Amazon, reinvest their
profits,224 helping shareholders without triggering a dividend-level tax). Even if this
second shareholder-level tax on dividends is modest (15% or 20% compared to 35%
or 39.6% on wages), the combination of a corporate tax rate of 35% and a
shareholder-level tax of any magnitude deterred smaller businesses from becoming
C corporations. Instead, many American businesses formed themselves as “passthrough” entities: partnerships, limited liability companies, S corporations, sole
proprietorships, and so forth. These types of firms do not pay taxes themselves, but
instead “pass through” their tax benefits and burdens to their individual owners, who
reflect them on their personal, individual income tax returns.225 That is all complex,
and not susceptible to a simple postcard return.
As TCJA was being discussed, the principal focus was on cutting the corporate
income tax rate, which was eventually reduced from 35% to 21%, a massive

221. I.R.C. § 1031 (2018).
222. I.R.C. § 199A (2018).
223. See supra text accompanying note 81.
224. See, e.g., Bob Ciura, Will Amazon Ever Pay a Dividend?, SURE DIVIDEND,
https://www.suredividend.com/amazon-dividend/
[https://perma.cc/HRC4-C6H5]
(last
updated Jan. 23, 2020).
225. See TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 199.
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decline.226 The individual income tax-rate cuts were far more modest, and many
individuals would even see their taxes go up, depending on where they lived and
other variables.227 At this point, however, the owners of pass-through businesses
squawked: Why should businesses in C corporation form have their taxes cut when
the profits of smaller businesses are still being taxed under the individual income tax
rate structure, which was barely, if at all, cut?228 This turned out to be a compelling
logical and political argument, and Trump and the Congress set about to help passthrough business owners.
In doing so, however, the politicians faced a technical problem. For many on the
pass-through side, business profits and wages to the owner-operators were not being
separately laid out. Suppose our old friend Ant went into business, selling lemonade.
To pay her taxes, she would first calculate her “income” as all monies she received
minus her costs for building the stand, renting some space, and purchasing supplies
(lemons, sugar, etc.). She would not, necessarily, look at her net profit as having both
a labor and a capital component—that is, she would not make a point of paying
herself wages and then seeing the business’s profit or loss after her own pay. There
would be no need to do that, as she would pay tax on the business’ profit from both
labor and capital at her personal income tax rate.
Hence “QBI.” The concept of qualified business income is to give owners of passthrough entities a break—a lower tax rate—on their return to wealth, while protecting
the inescapability of any tax on wages. This is not the place to go into all of the details
about how the QBI provision works, and those details are still emerging and
evolving—likely, as with the passive activity loss rules, this is an endeavor that will
take some time to sort out and settle down. But the point, the raison d’etre, of the
QBI rules is to take out one’s own wages from pass-through profits and to give the
residue—by definition the return to wealth not wages—a lower rate.
All this fits our basic story. Taxpayers whose income does not come primarily
from third-party employers—who, in turn, withhold the taxes from employee
paychecks and remit the monies to the federal government along with the taxpayerworker’s social security number—will stay in the ur-income tax, with forms and
complexity and potential audits. These will be Americans of wealth who buy and sell
assets. The rules about basis, capital gains, and nonrecognition provisions (such as
the “like-kind exchange rule” of I.R.C. § 1031) will endure but only affecting this
minority (most Americans with some modest savings will be able to avoid this
complexity through tax-favored savings accounts, perhaps Roth ones). There will
also be Americans who run their own business or who mingle wealth and wages

226. Pomerleau, supra note 198.
227. Bill Bischoff, Two Years After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act—Who Are the Winners and
the Losers?, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 28, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com
/story/two-years-after-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-who-are-the-winners-and-the-losers-2020
-02-11 [https://perma.cc/9H88-WF5W].
228. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, A Business Tax Fight Erupts Over the ‘Haves’ and ‘HaveMores’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/busines
s-tax-pass-throughs.html [https://perma.cc/497E-KWR3]; Dylan Matthews, “Pass-Through”
Companies, the Issue That Could Make or Break the Senate Tax Bill, Explained, VOX (Nov.
28, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/11/28/16709634/pass-through-republican-tax-bill
[https://perma.cc/VAF3-3795].
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somehow, such as the Wall Street financiers and their “carried interest.” Most
Americans—some 95%—will be able to fill out a postcard return (or none at all) and
will pay taxes on their wages, all of their wages, and only their wages. For the select
few, there will still be complex returns, complex laws, and complex planning. But
all of the resulting headaches will bring with them some elixir—lower or no tax
burdens. There will be a price to be paid for the breaks—to professional tax advisors
and to politicians and lobbyists—but not much given the ease with which the wealthy
can avoid all taxes.
QBI gives us a good look into what is likely to continue happening with the urincome tax. For those few Americans who must continue to pay individual income
taxes but who do not qualify for the simpler postcard-style standard-deduction return,
taxes will continue to be complex. QBI is complex, and many subjected to it will
require professional tax assistance. TCJA also changed I.R.C. § 1031 to limit its
benefits to real estate after politicians considered more radical changes (or even its
repeal)229 and addressed the “carried interest” issue of concern to Wall Street
financiers by requiring a three year holding period for capital-gains treatment for
managers’ profit interests.230 Aside from their complexity, what do such provisions
have in common? These are rules that only apply to the wealthy, and they typically
point to some tax avoidance or minimization strategy.
There is a perfect parallel in the death tax. Recall that this tax, notwithstanding
decades of weakening as chronicled by Graetz and Shapiro and others,231 has not
died. It persists, not raising much money but providing steady employment to
financiers and ongoing opportunities for Congress to extract campaign contributions
from the rich still subjected to it. As the universal wage tax arises as a hidden colossus
to pay the bills, the lingering wealth taxes—the gift and estate, corporate income,
and ur-income taxes—remain complex, porous, and frequently manipulated by
politicians and their rich patrons alike.
C. The Fundamental Things Apply
Back to “Buy/Borrow/Die.” All of the elements of Buy/Borrow/Die were in place
at the dawn of the modern income tax in 1913, or soon thereafter. It is plausible, even
easy, to consider that this is the problem with the income tax—these are the Achilles’
heels that render any serious attempt to tax wealth and not wages doomed from the
start. But that is not how things have gone down over the century plus. FDR did not
change any of the three legal planks—the realization requirement, the nontaxation of
debt, and the stepped-up basis for assets acquired on death—when he married the
young wealth tax onto a wage one. Ronald Reagan did not change any of the three
planks when he shored up the income tax as an effective wage tax by blocking the
sheltering of wage income in TRA 86. And, to complete the trifecta, Donald Trump

229. See Like-Kind Exchanges Now Limited to Real Property, IRS (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/like-kind-exchanges-now-limited-to-real-property [https://per
ma.cc/Y7AM-Z6FG].
230. See generally Marie Sapirie, Carrying On with Carried Interest, TAX
NOTES (Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/carrying-carried-interest
/2018/06/15/284jn [https://perma.cc/Y95S-K8P4].
231. See supra Section II.E.
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did not change any of the three planks either—in fact, he sweetened the tax treatment
of death by leaving the stepped-up basis in place for all in a world in which virtually
no one pays the death tax.
Norquist and company are winning. The income tax’s base is becoming a simple
wage tax for the masses, while tax games endure for the wealthy few.
D. Coming Attractions: Seeing a Future of Tax
The script predicts the future, as America continues to move towards a universal
wage tax, stumbling in Norquist’s footsteps. The handwriting is already quite visible:
we will end up where we have been heading for over a century, unless we awake and
change the paradigms of taxation, soon.
1. In Theatres Soon! Tax Cuts 2.0
Even as the ink was drying on the TCJA, Tax Cuts 1.0, conservatives and
Republicans, including President Trump, began touting Tax Cuts 2.0. Trump himself
claimed it was “time to look to the individual side.”232 What tax-cutting surprises
might lurk there?
For conservative lawmakers who have been steering tax policy, three specific
changes now loom on the horizon. Each furthers Norquist’s quest and the dream of
a universal wage tax. First, cut the capital-gains tax, which stayed at 20% under the
TCJA—essentially, one-half of the universal wage tax rate. The Trump
Administration even proposed effecting this result by executive action—a proposal
to index the bases of assets held to reflect inflation.233 Second, adopt universal
savings accounts along the Roth-style model—continuing the conservative assault
on redistribution since Norquist set out the steps in writing and figured out that the
best “one time” to tax income is as earned.234 Third, abolish the alternative minimum
tax.235 It should, of course, not surprise us that all three steps harken back to
Norquist’s five easy pieces and help to move us towards the universal wage tax. In
light of the obsessive quest for a “single tax,” which taxes income “just one time,”

232. Mike Calia, Trump, in a Joking Manner, Suggests ‘Phase 2’ of Tax Cuts in Speech to
GOP Lawmakers, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/01/trump-suggests
-possible-phase-2-of-tax-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/5ZSM-TURN].
233. Kelly Phillips Erb, New Tax Break? Trump Administration Considers Indexing
Capital Gains for Inflation, FORBES (July 31, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly
phillipserb/2018/07/31/new-tax-break-trump-administration-considers-indexing-capital-tax
-for-inflation/#383479325e1e [https://perma.cc/PBN4-CZTP]. But see Bob Bryan, Gary
Cohn: The Trump Administration’s $100 Billion Tax Cut Idea Was ‘Killed in 30 Seconds or
Less’, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/gary-cohn-on-trump
-100-billion-capital-gains-tax-inflation-index-cut-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/G248-VDME].
234. Ted Godbout, ‘Tax Reform 2.0’ to Include Universal Savings Accounts, NAT’L ASS’N
PLAN ADVISORS (July 25, 2018), https://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence
/legislation/tax-reform-2-0-to-include-universal-savings-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/9CUU
-NN96].
235. Adam Michel, Tax Reform 2.0: Priorities After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/tax-reform-20-prior
ities-after-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-2017 [https://perma.cc/2GGN-6K7E].
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many things begin to make sense. America is on a quest for a universal wage tax—
that is, a quest to kill the income tax.
2. Return of the Spending Side: Starving the Beast
Even before Congressional Republicans had gotten around to daydreaming of Tax
Cuts 2.0, they were indulging in another of their favorite dreams: entitlement
“reform.”236 These are, of course, code words for cutting social security and
Medicare benefits. It is easy to see why, going back to Figure 1, in which we see
labor’s share of the national income falling. Social security and other transfer
payments are helping workers adjust for the declining share of wages in the national
income.237 But these payments, in a certain sense, come from the workers themselves:
they are a “return” of the social security contributions of workers, baby boomers and
otherwise, in their youth.
But there is a serious timing problem here. As noted above, social security
payments are not set aside in any protected account for the particular worker who
paid into them. Today’s retirees depend on today’s workers for their social security
checks. But as older workers age and retire, and as new workers face stagnating
wages and a diminishing share of the national income for their labor, continuing the
payments to workers will become a challenge. Wage taxes, as we shall continue to
explore, are burdensome and inescapable. What could the government do to raise
more revenue without further raising payroll taxes? One answer, of course, would be
to raise wealth taxes (the corporate income, gift and estate, or true income taxes) to
balance the books, looking to the other factor of production to chip in. But that is not
the road chosen by Norquist and pals.
The problems seem pressing. With an aging population that is living longer, there
are fewer workers today to pay for workers past—to pay into the social security and
Medicare systems. In 2014, there were 4.6 workers per retiree in America; by 2100,
which is not all that far away, that ratio is expected to plummet to 1.9.238 The
shrinking workforce is facing stagnant wage growth and—the point of this Article—
is shouldering more and more of the burden of taxation even as it receives less and
less of the benefits of the social economic pie. Faced with this math, and worried
about any potential future assault on wealth (even a social request for capital to pay

236. See Tara Golshan, Top Republicans Are Already Talking About Cutting Medicare and
Social Security Next, VOX (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017
/12/18/16741730/gop-agenda-medicare-social-security [https://perma.cc/5MNJ-2D6K]; Jeff
Stein, Ryan Says Republicans to Target Welfare, Medicare, Medicaid
Spending in 2018, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2017/12/01/gop-eyes-post-tax-cut-changes-to-welfare-medicare-and-social-security/?ut
m_term=.5523e74f19a0 [https://perma.cc/CHU9-XYDQ].
237. Scott A. Hodge, 60 Percent of Households Now Receive More in Transfer Income
Than They Pay in Taxes, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2012), https://taxfoundation.org/60-percenthouseholds-now-receive-more-transfer-income-they-pay-taxes/
[https://perma.cc/AE7B
-9L5D].
238. Mark Fischetti, Ratio of Workers to Retirees Will Plummet Worldwide, SCI. AM. (Nov.
18, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/ratio-of-workers-to-retirees-will
-plummet-worldwide1/ [https://perma.cc/Q9XD-B2QG].
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a more respectable share of the society’s needs), conservatives continue to look to
entitlement “reform” to balance the books.
Politics of the basest, most tribal sort lies at the root of much of this. Norquist and
company have long sought to “starve the beast”: to reduce the size of government by
choking off its sources of revenue, getting government small enough to “drown it in
the bathtub,” in Norquist’s characteristically evocative phrase.239 Killing the income
tax and moving us towards a universal wage tax puts a political divide at work
towards this end. Because we are taxing only workers, we pit all workers against all
nonworkers—the poor, the retired, the elderly, and the sick—in practical, political
public finance---while the rich can sit idly by, untaxed. We are seeing some of the
results of this tension in our daily politics as I write.
3. The End (?)
The end of the days for the income tax is the culmination of Norquist’s quest. For
most, the income tax will have been transformed into a simple form, a postcard, or
maybe no form at all. The base will be wages. Nothing need be added, for all savings
will be tax free, and nothing need be subtracted, for all elective personal deductions
will have died. The corporate income and gift and estate taxes will persist as
annoying headaches for the wealthy few, and an ur-income tax will endure for the
top 1%–5% or so of taxpayers, full of twists and turns, good and bad. Most of the
government revenues come from the universal wage tax, a tax on salary split in two—
the payroll and individual “income” taxes. This combined tax will be simple to pay,
formless, exclusively drawn from wages, and inescapable. Wage-based benefits like
social security and Medicare will be cut. Workers will continue to struggle with
stagnating wages, disappearing jobs, and shrinking public benefits. The wealthy will
be fine and tax-free.
VI. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE MAGICAL MYSTERIES OF AMERICA’S UNIVERSAL
WAGE TAX
While much Sturm und Drang was playing out over more than a century, steadily
converting the income tax into a wage tax on the “base” side of the “base x rate”
product, the work on the “rate” side was happening even more quietly. The payroll
tax monotonically increased over its eighty-plus-year history, with the single
exception of the two years of the payroll tax cut holiday under Obama.240 The
individual income tax, in contrast, has seen massive cuts from its World War II peak
of 94%, falling dramatically under Reagan and flattening out under George W.
Bush.241
Now we are ready for a big reveal. Our story in three acts was a tale about the
income tax’s base. We have now seen that for most Americans—and for most
readers—the income tax’s base is wages. There is not much to add and not much to

239. See, e.g., Donald Cohen, Trump Wants to Drown Government in a Bathtub,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-wants-to-drown
-gove_b_14577752 [https://perma.cc/72ZM-6G6W].
240. See supra Figure 7.
241. See supra Figure 8.
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subtract. One day sooner rather than later, there may be nothing to add, nothing to
subtract, and no form to complete. In this world, the overwhelming majority of
Americans, some 95% or more, will face taxes on their wages and only on their
wages under two different taxes: the payroll tax and the wage/income tax. What is
the marginal tax rate schedule facing their labor efforts?
As an aside, I note that I have used many figures and tables along the way,
generally drawn from easily found public materials—pictures help stretch limited
word counts. But I could not find a single, combined chart showing marginal tax
rates under both the income and payroll taxes.242 So I had to create one, which turned
out to be highly illuminating.
I began by constructing Table 2, below. This shows the tax rates for a single
person who earns only wages and takes the standard deduction—a rather typical
American. The chart ignores the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which does not
apply because our single taxpayer has no children.243 Factoring in the EITC would
add some progressivity at the very bottom of the income scale but would offset this
with some regressivity in the lower-middle-income “payback” range, and I simply
ignore it here.244 Producing a table and figures for married persons would not
significantly change the picture.
Table 2: Combined Income and Payroll Tax Rates, Single Earner, 2018245
Wages
$0–12,000
$12,000–21,525
$21,525–50,700
$50,700–94,500
$94,500–128,400
$128,400–169,500
$169,500–200,000
$200,000–212,000
$212,000–512,000
$512,000 and up

Income Tax
Rate
0
10
12
22
24
24
32
32
35
37

Payroll Tax
Rate
15.3
15.3
15.3
15.3
15.3
2.9
2.9
3.8
3.8
3.8

Combined
Tax Rate
15.3
25.3
27.3
37.3
39.3
26.9
34.9
35.7
38.7
40.7

242. After a draft of this Article first appeared, a CBO study was published that shows the
combined average tax rates, at any moment in time, but not the range across incomes in any
given year. CONG. BUDGET OFF., MARGINAL FEDERAL TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME: 1962 TO
2028 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54911 [https://perma.cc/XMX4-SJ96].
243. See I.R.C. § 32 (2018).
244. The EITC, as a credit rather than a deduction, gives low-income taxpayers an annual
stipend of up to $6431 if they have three or more children; this declines proportionally to a
single taxpayer’s income starting at $18,660 and is fully phased out when the taxpayer earns
$49,194. See TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 199, at 159–63.
245. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 15, (CIRCULAR E),
EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4HTU-AVQU].
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Figures 13 and 14 present this Table in graphical form. Both are remarkable. First,
Figure 13 shows the payroll and income tax rates. What is striking is that the payroll
tax, the mainly lower line in Figure 14, provides 70% as much total revenue as the
individual income tax, the mainly top line, even though the payroll tax rate is barely
ever above the income tax rate in the Figure. There are once again optical illusions
at work.
I scaled the x-axis in the Figure up to $600,000, because the highest marginal rate
bracket for single taxpayers kicks in at $512,000, and I wanted to reflect the full
range in which there is marginal rate variation (the top rate continues into infinity).
The social security tax (or 12.4%) drops off at $128,400 of wages in 2018; at
$200,000 of income for an individual, a Medicare surcharge of 0.9% applies. Across
the range in which income tax rates are still varying, the payroll tax looks small. But
few Americans earn more than $128,400 (Warren Buffett does not, from Berkshire
Hathaway anyway). Because the payroll tax starts in at 15.3% on the first dollar of
wages, it takes a while for the income tax, which begins with a zero bracket (created
by the standard deduction) and works its way through 10% and 12% brackets, to get
to an average of 15.3%. Our taxpayer would have to earn more than $94,500 in
wages—she would have to get into the 24% marginal income tax rate bracket—
before her income tax burden would exceed her payroll tax one. That is more than
twice the median salary of a working American today246—explaining why the payroll
tax is the major tax for most workers.

246. Alison Doyle, Average Salary Information for US workers, THE BALANCE,
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/average-salary-information-for-us-workers-2060808
[https://perma.cc/4A82-94XG] (last updated Feb 29, 2020).
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Figure 13: Income and Payroll Tax Marginal Rates, 2018247
Labor Marginal Tax Rates, 2018

Figure 13 is surprising because it appears that the individual income tax is the
major tax for high incomes (which as we know by now is not the wealthy but rather
the high-wage income). But Figure 14 is the real showstopper. It clearly reveals that
when we combine the payroll and income taxes—when we look at the combined tax
rate on wages for most Americans—things are surprisingly, even shockingly, flat.
Our hypothetical taxpayer starts in at the 15.3% payroll tax rate, of course: there is
no “zero bracket” under the universal wage tax. By the time she has earned $12,000
out of the individual income tax’s standard deduction, she finds herself in a 25.3%
rate bracket, which balloons to 37.3% at $50,700—just about median household
income. The rate continues to go up, hitting 39.3% for the range $94,500 to $128,400.
That is a rate level she will not hit again until she is fortunate enough to earn more
than $500,000 in wages (which few do, of course). Aside from a brief and modest
respite, from $128,400 to $169,500, after the social security payroll tax portion has
dropped out, our taxpayer stays at or above a 34.9% rate once she hits $50,000.
Indeed, to a first approximation, this is a flat 35% wage tax after $50,000 of wages,
with a couple of steps—15% and 25%, roughly—on the way.
Figure 13 shows that as Norquist and company have been fairly quiet, working
over decades to transform the base of the income tax into a wage tax; the rate work
has been happening in tandem, significantly pushed along by the Reagan and Bush
tax cuts. Americans have a flattened rate and are getting close to a flat wage tax for
the masses. The wealthy, as they typically do, stay off the page.

247. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 245.
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Figure 14: Universal Wage Tax Rates 2018248
The 2018 Universal Wage Tax

VII. POST MORTEMS AND PATHS FORWARD
In 1913, with whispers of progressive politics in the air, Americans ratified a
constitutional amendment allowing for a tax on all “incomes, from whatever source
derived.”249 This set the stage for the individual income tax, a tax meant to fall on
wealth and the wealthy. It was a small step, but it was a step. Capital and labor,
wealth and wages, would each be paying the price of civilization. The corporate
income and gift and estate taxes soon formed a troika of wealth taxes, though the
individual income tax fell on upper-income wages as well.
Things changed. Over a century later, the “income” tax has slowly, steadily
morphed into a wage tax for the masses—a simple tax on wages, withheld from
paychecks, with little or nothing to add or subtract, heading towards a postcard or
formlessness. As this script, set forth by Grover Norquist and like-minded
conservatives, has played out, all taxes on wealth have been falling. The corporate
income tax, once a major player in federal revenues, has been slashed yet again by
President Trump. The death tax is almost dead, again nearly killed for good by
Trump, persisting as cover for political games affecting the wealthy. And while an
ur-income tax remains, ostensibly to collect some revenue from wealth not wages,
its commitment to truly taxing wealth remains as porous as ever—none of the
original income tax’s Achilles’ heels, Buy/Borrow/Die, have been addressed.
Meantime, the payroll tax has continued its steady growth, the small exceptional
hiccup of President Obama’s payroll tax holiday only proving the rule of America’s
inexorable march towards wage taxation.

248. Id.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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All of this matters. In the world, as Piketty’s work and our own eyes can show us,
wealth is winning, and wages are losing. Yet wealth is using its power to avoid
paying for itself. This is a world of oligarchy, where capital has bought politicians
who keep their tax burdens low for the price of campaign contributions and other
support. Almost all of the burdens of taxation fall on wages, at a time when wages
are barely treading water. Taxes on wages are easily collected, easily raised, and
easily hidden. The brutal math of an advanced capitalist economy is that small taxes
on a wide base of the masses’ combined paychecks can cover up for massive
giveaways to the comparatively small number of wealthy people. A two percent
increase in the payroll tax can pay for repeal of the death tax, for example, with
hundreds of billions to spare. Warren Buffett can gain $10 billion from a tax cut that
brings mere dollars, at best, to the many.
History and common sense, let alone empathy, supply reasons to believe that this
situation cannot endure. A shrinking labor base cannot perpetually bear an increasing
tax burden and see the benefits particular to their life situations slashed, while a
growing class of the wealthy need not work or pay taxes. None of this bodes well for
the future.
It is not too late. There is hope, as there must be. We can change tax—analytic
possibilities for extracting a meaningful share of tax from the wealthy exist. The
recent proposals from AOC, to raise the top marginal tax rates under the income tax,
Senator Warren, to add a stand-alone wealth tax to the existing mix of taxes, and
Vice President Biden, to repeal the “angel of death” rule of IRC Section 1014, are
promising beginnings. But all of these ideas suffer from a certain allegiance to the
status quo; each operates within the existing paradigm of nominally attempting to tax
“income” and “wealth”—wealth transfers, in the case of the status quo, wealth itself,
in the case of Senator Warren’s proposal. AOC’s idea would only increase rates
under the existing income tax, which is not an income tax at all as we have seen, and
so it, alone, would not address the central problem of taxing wealth.250 Warren’s
proposal applies only to those with wealth over $50 million, and will be complicated
to design, enact, and enforce. Biden’s idea is an incremental change to the income
tax, long overdue, but showing no signs of happening any time soon. Still, these are
important ideas, bursting forth from a veritable desert of progressive tax alternatives
in the public political discussion.
My preferred alternative involves a paradigm shift, to a progressive spending tax,
which would tax people on what they spend, whether financed by wages or wealth,
and at progressive rates.251 The high marginal rates would not fall on wages alone,
because workers could choose to save.252 A separate stand-alone tax on wealth would
not be needed, because wealth would be taxed as the wealthy spend. A progressive
spending tax is a practical, well supported idea that I have explored at great length

250. See Edward J. McCaffery, On Taxes, Ocasio-Cortez Has the Right Impulse but the
Wrong Remedy, CNN (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/opinions/ocasio
-cortez-tax-plan-right-impulse-wrong-remedy-mccaffery/index.html [https://perma.cc/YW7
K-RME5].
251. See generally MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 123; McCaffery, supra
note 10.
252. Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in
Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2010).
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elsewhere: word counts press at the moment. The aim of this Article has not been to
support a specific change; rather, its end has been to convince as many readers as
possible of the need for some change. America needs a vigorous and serious debate
about any and all means of taxing wealth seriously, and the clock for effective action
is ticking.
It is time, past time, to change. The new ideas of AOC, Senator Warren, Vice
President Biden, and others show promise for better days ahead. But there are miles
to go before we get there—before we have real, effective taxation of the wealthy. We
must be persistent on the path to economic justice. Studying and noticing the broad
trends in tax policy in the United States, to see that wealth is winning by escaping
taxes while wages are losing by shouldering them, is no more or less than the basic
advice to all who would observe and comment on life in America today: follow the
money. However long it takes, that journey usually leads to some important answers,
if only after deepening a sense of despair.

